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Allowing Another Policeman on the Information 
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the 
Internet in the Face of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Michael W. Loudenslager1 
“Invocation of ‘the Internet’ is not the equivalent to a cry of 
‘sanctuary’ upon a criminal’s entry into a medieval church.” 
 
– Judge Diane A. Lebedeff 2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet3 currently is one of the fastest growing methods of 
communication in the United States.4 According to a survey taken by the 
United States Department of Commerce Census Bureau, over 53 percent 
of the United States population (143 million people) used the Internet as 
of September 2001.5 At the touch of a button, the Internet provides users 
with accessibility to a greater amount of information than ever before. 
The Internet provides an inexpensive method of communication 
allowing a person to publish information worldwide with minimum start-
 
 1. Assistant Professor of Lawyering Skills, University of Dayton School of Law; J.D., 
Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., Economics, Political Science, Miami 
University. The author would like to thank Professor Allan Ides and Dean Lisa Kloppenberg for 
commenting on earlier drafts of this article. 
 2. People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1997). 
 3. “The Internet” is a term coined from the “interconnected network” that makes up this 
computer system. Ari Lanin, Note, Who Controls The Internet? States’ Rights and the Reawakening 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423 n.1 (2000). “The Internet is a diverse set 
of independent networks, interlinked to provide its users with the appearance of a single, uniform 
network.” COMM. ON THE INTERNET IN THE EVOLVING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE ET AL., THE 
INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE 29 (2001) [hereinafter THE INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE]. See also 
Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace: Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 
68 TUL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993) (“[T]he Internet is not a single integrated entity; rather, it is a loosely 
connected web of local, regional, and national computer networks that share certain procedures for 
addressing and routing computer data.”). 
 4. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: HOW AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING 
THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET 1, 10 (2002) (stating that, according to a Census Bureau survey taken 
in September 2001, “[t]he rate of growth of Internet use in the United States is currently two million 
new Internet users per month” and that “Internet use has grown at a rate of 20 percent a year since 
1998”), at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/anationonline2.pdf (Feb. 2002). 
 5. Id. at 10. 
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up time and expense. All a person needs in order to communicate or 
publish information worldwide is a personal computer with Web browser 
software, a telephone line, a computer modem, and Internet access 
provided by an Internet service provider.6  Much of this can be obtained 
free of charge.7 
A whole new segment of the economy has sprung up due to the 
creation of the Internet. Many existing companies with traditional brick 
and mortar stores now also provide services and products over the 
Internet, and numerous new companies exist that provide their services 
and products only over the Internet. As a result, Americans now conduct 
a significant amount of commerce over the Internet.8 Almost 70 percent 
of American Internet users search for product and service information 
through this medium, and almost 40 percent of Internet users purchase 
products and services while online.9 With the United States teen 
population engaging in, proportionally, the largest amount of Internet 
use,10 one can expect the amount of commerce occurring over the 
Internet only to increase as this segment of the population continues to 
mature and to integrate even more into the economy. 
While the growth in Internet use has brought with it many positive 
effects, this growth in Internet use also has drawbacks. Due to the 
existence of the Internet, pornographic materials are more accessible to 
minors.11 Minors are more susceptible to pedophiles.12 Various types of 
gambling are now more readily available to gambling addicts and those 
 
 6. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text (describing how the World Wide Web 
works). 
 7. For example, people can obtain access to all of these necessities at many public libraries, 
and some Internet service providers give people Internet access for little or no fee. 
 8. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 30 (finding that 21 percent of the United 
States population “made online purchases and 8.1 percent conducted banking online” and 
“approximately one-third of Americans used the Internet to search for product and service 
information”). But see Lorrie Grant, Online Sales Up, But Expectations Down, USA TODAY, May 
31, 2002, at B7 (stating that in the first quarter of 2002 only 1.3 percent of total retail sales in the 
United States occurred online). 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 31 fig. 6 (showing that as of 2001 67.3 
percent of individuals online used the Internet to search for product and service information and 39.1 
percent of these individuals used the Internet to purchase products and services). 
 10. Id. at 43 (stating that 58.5 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 17 use the 
Internet). The rate of Internet use among teens and pre-teens is even higher, with over 75 percent of 
14 to 17 year olds and over 65 percent of 10 to 13 year olds using the Internet. Id. The Department 
of Commerce study concluded that “the Internet has become integrated into children’s daily 
routines” and that “[a]s a result, teenagers and young adults in school are now among the highest 
Internet users.” Id. at 53. 
 11. See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text (describing New York statute designed to 
prevent minors from accessing sexually explicit material on the Internet). 
 12. See infra note 326 and accompanying text (listing cases dealing with state Internet 
regulations intended to protect children from contact with pedophiles). 
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who cannot afford gambling debts,13 and more opportunities exist for 
scam artists to defraud consumers under the guise of legitimate 
businesses.14 
State and local governments have traditionally addressed these social 
ills. In fact, the rectification of such problems historically has called on 
states to exercise what is known as their “police powers” through state 
legislation or regulations.15  However, several courts have held that state 
governments cannot protect their citizens from such problems through 
regulation of Internet activity due to the negative or “dormant” aspect of 
the Commerce Clause.16 
The dormant commerce clause is an implicit aspect of the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution.17 This doctrine maintains that 
because Congress has the power to regulate and promote trade among 
states, state governments cannot promulgate legislation or regulations 
that frustrate or inhibit trade between states, even in the absence of 
Congressional legislation.18 Several courts have held that virtually any 
 
 13. See infra note 337 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 327 and accompanying text (listing cases dealing with the application of 
state regulations to the Internet to protect against unfair business practices). 
 15. See infra notes 328-29, 336 and accompanying text (explaining the areas in which the 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that states exercise their police powers). 
 16. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1160-63 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that statute 
making dissemination of harmful material to minors by computer a misdemeanor was 
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause and the First Amendment); Am. Booksellers 
Found. for Free Expression v. Dean, 202 F. Supp. 2d 300, 306, 320-321 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding that a 
Vermont statute criminalizing the dissemination of images “communicated, transmitted, or stored 
electronically” that are “harmful to minors” was unconstitutional under the dormant commerce 
clause); PSINet v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882, 891 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that a 
Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor to display an “electronic file or message containing an 
image” or words depicting sexually explicit material “harmful to juveniles” violated the dormant 
commerce clause); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739-40, 751-52 
(E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that amendments to a Michigan statute that criminalized the use of 
computers or the Internet “to disseminate sexually explicit materials to minors” violated the dormant 
commerce clause), aff’d, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 
160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a New York statute criminalizing the dissemination of 
harmful material to minors by computer was unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause); 
State v. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d 672, 679-80, 684-86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (stating that section 
235.22 of the New York Penal Code, which made it a crime to disseminate harmful material over the 
Internet to a minor in order to induce a minor to engage in sexual intercourse or sexual contact with 
the disseminator, violated the dormant commerce clause to the extent that the statute applied to 
interstate transmissions). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 18. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (“For a hundred years it has been 
accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional 
legislation, thus affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, 
and that in such cases, where Congress has not acted, [the Supreme Court of the United States], and 
not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of 
state and national interests.”). See also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) 
(recognizing that the Commerce Clause has “a negative sweep as well,” which “prohibits certain 
state actions that interfere with interstate commerce”); 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 
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state regulation of the Internet will sufficiently frustrate interstate 
commerce to invalidate such regulation.19 
Several commentators have latched on to these cases to make 
numerous broad assertions. One has stated, “the Internet should be 
marked off as a national preserve subject only to uniform federal 
regulation.”20 Other commentators have asserted that “states have very 
little leeway to control the Internet and Internet-related activities,”21 and 
that states have “very little hope of ever validly restricting materials on 
the Internet.”22 Yet another commentator has suggested that self-
regulation by Internet content providers is the only viable method of 
combating the problems mentioned above.23 However, such views 
virtually strip the states of any power to protect their citizens from harms 
traditionally dealt with by state and local governments and remove any 
concept of federalism from the regulation of the Internet. Under these 
views, in the absence of federal regulation, the Internet becomes a safe 
haven for actors wishing to perpetuate various social ills on state citizens, 
and state governments are left powerless to stop such actors and protect 
their residents. 
Clearly, the view that the dormant commerce clause leaves no room 
for state regulation of Internet activity is too broad. Such a view fails 
both to give sufficient deference to states’ abilities to exercise their 
police powers to protect their citizenry and to recognize that certain Web 
sites that interact with residents of particular states or conduct trade in 
tangible goods can and should comply with the laws and regulations of 
those states. Several recent cases have recognized this and held that state 
 
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, § 11.1, at 133 (3d ed. 1999) 
(“When local legislation thwarts the operation of the common market of the United States, the local 
laws have then exceeded the permissible limits of the dormant commerce clause.”); Michael A. 
Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 
21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 396-97 (1998) (“The Court has responded to these uncertainties 
‘by interpreting the affirmative grant of commerce powers to [Congress] as imposing some self-
executing limitations on the scope of permissible state regulation.’”) (quoting an earlier edition of 
ROTUNDA & NOWAK). 
 19. ACLU, 194 F.3d at 1162 (“The Internet is surely such a medium [that requires national 
regulation].”); Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 181 (“The Internet represents one of those areas 
[demanding consistent treatment]; effective regulation will require national, and more likely global, 
cooperation.”). 
 20. Kenneth D. Bassinger, Note, Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on State Regulation of 
the Internet: The Transportation Analogy, 32 GA. L. REV. 889, 890 (1998) (quoting from Am. 
Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 169). 
 21. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1424. 
 22. Jennifer LaMaina, Note, Wipe Out in ACLU v. Johnson: Can Any Regulation of Surfing 
the Net Withstand Constitutional Scrutiny?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 159 (2001). 
 23. Christopher S.W. Blake, Note, Destination Unknown: Does the Internet’s Lack of 
Physical Situs Preclude State and Federal Attempts to Regulate It?, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 129, 156-
57 (1998). 
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statutes applicable to Internet activity do not violate the dormant 
commerce clause.24 
This article begins by explaining how the Internet operates, focusing 
especially on those aspects that present issues for state regulation under 
the dormant commerce clause. Next, it reviews the Supreme Court’s 
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. The case law to date applying 
the Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause principles to state 
regulation of the Internet follows. This article explains why case law and 
commentators finding that virtually no state regulation of the Internet can 
comply with the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause overstate the 
case and why the states should be allowed to protect their interests and 
their citizens by exercising their police powers as the states have done for 
the last two hundred years. This article then explains how considering the 
proper factors involved in Internet commerce would affect the courts’ 
analysis in several cases analyzing state regulation of the Internet under 
the dormant commerce clause. 
II.  INTERNET BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A.  How the Internet Works 
One must understand how the Internet operates to appreciate fully 
the issues posed by state regulation of this communications network 
under the dormant commerce clause.25 
1.  Packet-switching technology and distributed networks 
Two characteristics of Internet operations raise particular issues for 
state regulation. First, unlike other communications networks, the 
Internet uses a “packet-switched” network,26 as opposed to being 
 
 24. Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 499-505 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that application of Texas motor vehicle code to car manufacturer operating a Web site in 
order to sell cars in Texas did not violate the dormant commerce clause); Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 453, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophiles’ 
activities on the Internet did not violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 184, 190-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophiles’ 
activities on the Internet did not violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Foley, 692 
N.Y.S.2d 248, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that New York statute criminalizing the 
dissemination of indecent material to minors through the Internet in order to lure minors to engage in 
sexual activity passed dormant commerce clause analysis); People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 
(Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding that the application of New York consumer protection laws to New York 
business due to Internet solicitations was proper under the dormant commerce clause). 
 25. For a comprehensive discussion of the origins and growth of the Internet, see infra 
APPENDIX. 
 26. For further explanation of “packet-switching,” see infra notes 28-33 and accompanying 
text. 
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“circuit-switched”27 like the telephone network. The Internet transports 
“packets”28 of computer data across shared communication lines and then 
reassembles these packets when they arrive at their destination.29 The 
“irregular, bursty characteristics of computer-generated data traffic” are 
not especially compatible with a circuit-switched network.30 Using a 
circuit-switched line, which is reserved for the communication until 
completed, for the transportation of “bursty” computer data would leave 
the line idle for large periods of time and be very inefficient.31 Therefore, 
packet-switched networks decrease costs because they require fewer 
connections for transferring computer data.32 The downside to such 
 
 27. “Circuit-switched” means that “a communications line [is] reserved for one call at a time 
and held open for the duration of that session.” KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE 
WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET, 60 (1996). See also KIERSTEN CONNER-
SAX & ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET: THE NEXT GENERATION 13 (1999) (stating that in a 
circuit-switched network like the telephone system “[w]hen you make a call, you get a piece of the 
network dedicated to you”); Morse, supra note 27, at 1120 (“Circuit-switched networks, such as 
found in telephone systems, are based on forming dedicated connections, or ‘circuits,’ between the 
two users.”). 
 28. Donald Davies, a physicist at Britain’s National Physics Laboratory, coined this term for 
the “short pieces of data which traveled separately” throughout the network. See HAFNER & LYON, 
supra note 27, at 64, 67 (quoting Davies). 
 29. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 16 (describing how “information sent across 
[the Internet] is broken up into bite-sized pieces called packets” and then is “paste[d]” back together 
at its destination); Morse, supra note 27, at 1120 (“Packet-switching involves a process of breaking 
down electronic files into separate parts, encasing these parts in electronic envelopes or ‘packets’ 
that are routed through the network, and then reassembling the packets into a coherent whole at the 
destination.”); Burk, supra note 3, at 12 (“Packet switching allows efficient and economical use of a 
single communication channel by breaking messages into packages that are transmitted among host 
computers on a network; the hosts then reassemble the packages received.”). See also HAFNER & 
LYON, supra at 61 (describing how initial plans for an interconnected network envisioned computer 
messages that “would be divided into specific blocks, which would then be sent out individually 
over the network through multiple locations, and reassembled at their destination”). 
Some authors compare packet-switched networks to the operations of the United States Postal 
Service. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 13; Morse, supra note 27, at 1116-17. “You have 
no dedicated piece of the network. What you want to send is mixed together with everyone else’s 
stuff, put in a pipeline, transferred to another post office, and sorted out again.” CONNER-SAX & 
KROL, supra note 27, at 13. “[The Postal Service] collects mail from a sender’s address, sorts it, and 
then routes it to a collection point near the destination, where it is further sorted and delivered to a 
particular address.” Morse, supra note 27, at 1116-17. 
 30. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 66. See also Burk, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that 
circuit-switched networks are “poorly adapted to the speed of computer communications and data 
processing”). 
 31. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 60-61 (describing the incompatibility of circuit-
switched networks with computer data which “pours out in short bursts followed by empty pauses 
that leave the line idle much of the time, wasting its ‘bandwidth,’ or capacity”). “The advantage of 
[circuit-switched] networking lies in its guaranteed capacity: once a circuit is established, no other 
network activity will decrease the capacity of that circuit. One disadvantage of [circuit-switched] 
technology arises from cost: circuit costs are fixed, independent of use.” DOUGLAS E. COMER, 
INTERNETWORKING WITH TCP/IP: PRINCIPLES, PROTOCOLS, AND ARCHITECTURES 18 (4th ed. 
2000). 
 32. COMER, supra note 31, at 18. 
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networks is that “whenever a packet switched network becomes 
overloaded, computers using the network must wait before they can send 
additional packets.”33 
Second, the Internet uses a “distributed” network,34 as opposed to a 
centralized one, to transport packets of computer data. This network 
consists of “numerous stand alone computers or nodes” with each 
computer interconnected to several other computers, forming a fishnet or 
spider web if laid out graphically.35 “Routers” are the computers that 
comprise the “nodes” of the Internet that transport data packets from one 
location to another.36 Thus, information ultimately is contained, stored 
and used in the computers at the end of each network, and the routers in 
between are responsible only for transporting information packets in the 
most efficient manner possible. 
The Internet developed in this manner in order to decrease the 
amount of resources used by the host computers for network functions 
and to route data efficiently between computers that used different 
operating systems and programming languages.37 A distributed network 
also has the positive effect of better protecting against a network-wide 
outage.38 A distributed network, thus, allows the different computer data 
packets that comprise a single message to “take many different routes 
[getting] from point A to point B.”39 Consequently, the packet-switched 
and distributed network causes computer data to travel in a transient 
manner through numerous state borders whenever anyone uses the 
Internet. 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Paul Baran of RAND originally developed the term “distributed” for such networks. 
HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 58. 
 35. Michael A. Geist, The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic Activity in the Age of the 
Internet, 73 WASH. L. REV. 521, 527 (1998). See also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 58 
(describing Paul Baran’s idea for a computer network comprised of “interconnected nodes 
resembling a distorted lattice, or fish net”). 
 36. See THE INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 32 (“Routers are computer 
devices located throughout the Internet that transfer information across the Internet from a source to 
a destination.”); CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 14 (“The different pieces of the Internet 
are connected by a set of computers called routers, which connect networks together.”). In the 
ARPAnet, the routers originally were known as “IMPs,” pronounced “imps,”which was short for 
“interface message processors.” HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 75. 
 37. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 73 (explaining why the creators of the ARPAnet 
used a distributed as opposed to a centralized network). 
 38. See Geist, supra note 35, at 527 (stating that in a distributed network, “[i]f part of the 
network was incapacitated, a message could still travel through an alternate route”). 
 39. Id. 
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2.  Routers, Internet protocols and the domain name system 
The routers used in the Internet’s distributed network transport 
computer data in the following manner. The routers communicate with 
one another about where to send data packets and whether the destination 
computer has actually received data packets sent.40 Based on previously 
determined criteria, the routing software determines the best routers to 
use to send data from one location to another.41 The path that a router 
uses to send data to the next router depends on the information that the 
router receives from other routers about how many data packets are 
being sent along a particular path at that particular time.42 In this manner, 
data sent from one computer in a location to a computer at another 
physical location can proceed through an almost limitless variety of 
routers that changes with the amount of traffic that each router along the 
way is experiencing at any point in time. This increases the reliability of 
the Internet “because it allows the network to dynamically reconfigure its 
routing state continually (including routing around links that have failed) 
yet still deliver [data] packets.”43 
The creators of the Internet had to develop a computer language, or 
set of “protocols,”44 for the routers to be able to communicate with each 
other, with the host computers, and for host computers to communicate 
with one another.45 Ultimately, an additional set of protocols had to be 
 
 40. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 75 (describing the functions of the original IMPs 
as being “interconnecting the network, sending and receiving data, checking for errors, 
retransmitting in the event of errors, routing data, and verifying that messages arrived at their 
intended destinations”). See also CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 14 (stating that routers 
“make decisions about how to route data (or packets), just like a postal substation decides how to 
route envelopes containing mail”). 
 41. THE INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 32. See also CONNER-SAX & KROL, 
supra note 27, at 14 (“[A] router looks at where your data is going, decides which of the routers it is 
directly connected to will get it most efficiently closer to its destination, and sends it down the 
pipeline to that router.”). 
 42. THE INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 32. 
 43. Id. at 40. 
 44. One set of authors defines a “protocol” as a “standardized method of information 
transmission.” CHRISTOS J.P. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., HISTORY OF THE INTERNET, 294 (1999). 
 45. Some commentators have recognized these computer protocols as one of the most 
significant developments of the ARPAnet because they standardized communications between 
computers using different operating systems and computer languages. See HAFNER & LYON, supra 
note 27, at 227 (stating that the development of transmission-control protocol was “absolutely 
crucial to networking”); Burk, supra note 3, at 16 (“During the 1970s, DARPA promulgated the set 
of computer communication standards known as the ‘Internet protocols,’ which were quickly 
adopted by independent networks attached to the ARPAnet backbone.”); Morse, supra note 27, at 
1119 (“The desire to provide communication between computers in different networks—
internetwork communication or internetworking—is essential to understanding the Internet as it is 
known today.”). 
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developed to allow not only computers, but also different networks to 
communicate with one another and exchange information.46 
TCP/IP is the set of computer protocols that facilitates the 
transportation of data packets across networks. The protocols are divided 
into two distinct categories that serve different functions: Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) and Transmission Control Protocol (“TCP”). Typically, 
computer files of any significant size need to “be broken into many 
packets that are sent across the network one at a time.”47 The different 
data packets for the file “carr[y] identification that enables the [routers] 
to know how to send [them] to the specified destination.”48 IP is the part 
of the computer protocols that contains this identification that “handles 
the routing of individual” data packets.49 The routers then “deliver[] the 
packets to the specified destination, where software reassembles them 
into a single file again.”50 If a particular data packet does not “arrive or 
[is] garbled during transmission, and the sending” computer does not 
receive an acknowledgment that the end computer received the packet, 
the sending computer sends the data packet again.51 TCP is the portion of 
the protocols that takes care of these latter functions of breaking 
computer files up into different packets and reassembling the packets at 
the destination computer as well as addressing any errors that occurred in 
the transmission of the data.52 
 
 46. See generally HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 223-27 (describing the development of 
“transmission-control protocol,” or “TCP,” in order to allow networks to communicate with one 
another). “Gateways” are the routers that transport computer data between different networks, as 
opposed to just transporting data within a network. Id. at 223. See also Burk, supra note 3, at 13 
(“[N]etworks with different protocols may be linked by special packet switches, called gateway 
computers, that pass packets between networks while accommodating differences in network speed, 
packet length, and error correction.”). 
 47. COMER, supra note 31, at 18. See also CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 16 
(stating that “the information within a [data] packet is usually between 1 and (approximately) 1,500 
characters long” and that “[m]ost information transfers are longer than 1,500 characters long”). 
 48. COMER, supra note 31, at 18. 
 49. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 91. See also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 
236 (stating that IP is “responsible for routing individual datagrams”); CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra 
note 27, at 14 (“The Internet Protocol takes care of addressing—they make sure that the routers 
know what to do with your data when it arrives.”); Morse, supra note 27, at 1121 (“IP (internet 
protocol) provides the rules for computer communication by specifying how the packet must be 
formed and providing the process for forwarding packets to the intended destination.”). 
 50. COMER, supra note 31, at 18. 
 51. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 227. 
 52. Id. at 236 (stating that TCP is “responsible for breaking up messages into [data packets], 
reassembling them at the other end, detecting errors, resending anything that [gets] lost, and putting 
packets back in the right order”); Morse, supra note 27, at 1121 (“TCP (transmission control 
protocol) provides additional support to solve problems that may occur in transmission, such as lost 
or duplicate packets, or packets that may be received out of order.”). 
TCP takes the information you want to transmit and breaks it up into pieces. It numbers 
each piece so you can verify receipt and the data can be put back in the proper order. . . . 
On the receiving side, the TCP protocol collects the [data packets], extracts the data, and 
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At the IP level, Internet addresses consist of a series of numbers that 
indicate, among other things, the network sending the computer data and 
the computer that is supposed to receive the data.53 However, these series 
of numbers are not very user friendly.54 Therefore, the Internet utilizes a 
Domain Name System (“DNS”) that assigns textual names to Internet 
addresses for user convenience.55 Special computers then translate, or 
“resolve,” these textual names into numerical IP addresses for Internet 
routers.56 “Each level in this system is called a domain,” and these levels 
or domains indicate, among other things, the particular computer that is 
to receive the communication as well as the organization on whose 
network the computer is located.57  “Domain names reflect a hierarchical 
structure with each part separated by a period. These parts are organized 
so that the highest level domain name appears last, and the lowest level 
name appears first.”58 Therefore, as a person proceeds to read a complete 
domain name, from left to right, the domains go from the most specific 
or local to the most generalized.59 Thus, the first name on the left might 
indicate the actual computer that is supposed to receive the 
communication while the last name at the far right of the textual name, 
the “top-level” domain, indicates the type of organization that runs the 
network where the computer receiving the communication is located.60 In 
the United States, different types of organizations are given different top-
level domain names.61 For example, commercial organizations use the 
“.com” domain, educational institutions use “.edu,” and United States 
 
puts it in the proper order. If some of the [data packets] are missing, it asks the sender to 
retransmit them. Once it has all the information in the proper order, it passes the data to 
whatever application program is using its services. 
CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 16-17. 
 53. Id. at 15. “IP addresses contain four fields, with each field containing a value between 0 
and 255.” Morse, supra note 27, at 1121. “Each computer with an Internet connection has an ‘IP 
address’ which functions much like a specific telephone number.” Id. 
 54. See Morse, supra note 27, at 1121(stating that “[t]he numeric format of IP addresses . . . 
is difficult for human beings to remember”). 
 55. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 17-18 (describing the need for and the 
workings of the DNS); COMER, supra note 31, at 465 (“The mechanism that implements a machine 
name hierarchy for TCP/IP internets is called the Domain Name System (DNS).”). 
 56. See JOE HABRAKEN, ABSOLUTE BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO NETWORKING, 240 (3d ed. 2001) 
(“DNS servers . . . supply the actual mechanism for resolving [domain names] to IP addresses.”). 
 57. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 18. 
 58. Morse, supra note 27, at 1122. 
 59. See COMER, supra note 31, at 466 (“[D]omain names are written with the local label first 
and the top domain last.”). 
 60. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 18. 
 61. See HABRAKEN, supra note 56, at 242 (providing a table describing the different top-
level domains). 
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governmental entities use “.gov.”62 By organizing Internet addresses into 
“manageable pieces,” the DNS allows users to more easily locate the 
computers, among the hundreds of thousands connected to the Internet, 
with which they desire to communicate.63 
3. The operation of the World Wide Web 
Within the Internet system just described, several types of 
communications can occur.64 However, this article will explain in detail 
only the operation of the World Wide Web (the “Web”) over the Internet 
because it is the most widely used part of the Internet,65 it is the most 
important component of the Internet to national commerce,66 and it holds 
the greatest promise for business growth. Because the specifications of 
the Web are public, any business, or any person for that matter, can 
create a document on the World Wide Web, or a “Web page,” that “can 
contain text, graphics, sounds, video clips, and more.”67 “Documents 
available on the Web” are stored on computers located all over the world 
“running Web server software.”68 In order to access Web documents, or 
Web pages, a Web user must have a computer with Web “browser” 
 
 62. Id. The other top-level domains are: “.org” for “noncommercial organizations and 
institutions,” “.mil” for the United States military, “.net” for “companies involved in the Internet 
infrastructure,” and “.int” for “registering organizations as defined by international treaties.” Id. 
Additionally, outside the United States, a “[t]wo-letter country code” can be used for “a country’s 
top-level domain.” Id. 
 63. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 19. 
 64. The types of communications that can occur over the Internet include the World Wide 
Web, e-mail, listservs, newsgroups, Internet Relay Chat and File Transfer Protocol, among others. 
Lanin, supra note 3, at 1429. See generally HABRAKEN, supra note 56, at 226-238 (describing e-
mail, newsgroups, the World Wide Web, and File Transfer Protocol in more detail); CONNER-SAX & 
KROL, supra note 27, at 22-44, 47-63, 98-99, 108-134 (describing in detail e-mail, listservs, 
newsgroups, Internet Relay Chat, and the World Wide Web in that order). 
 65. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1430. See also PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611, 
615 (W.D. Va. 2000) (stating that the Web “is currently the most popular way to provide and 
retrieve information on the Internet”); CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 107 (“The World 
Wide Web, or WWW, is the most popular, powerful, and easily navigable portion of the Internet.”); 
COMER, supra note 31, at 4 (“Some service providers estimate that the Web now accounts for 80% 
of their Internet traffic”); Barry Fraser, Regulating the Net: Case Studies in California and Georgia 
Show How Not to Do It, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 230, 233 (1997) (“[B]y far the most popular 
[Internet] retrieval method today is the World Wide Web.”). 
 66. See Morse, supra note 27, at 1128 (stating that “commercial transactions” on the Internet 
“generally occur on the World Wide Web”). 
 67. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1430. See also CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 107 
(“Because the specifications [of the World Wide Web] are public, anyone can build a web client or 
server.”); HABRAKEN, supra note 56, at 236 (“HTML [Hypertext Markup Language,] offers a rich 
environment for creating documents that can include graphics, sound, video, and links to other 
HTML documents, such as other Web sites.”). 
 68. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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software which will interpret and display hypertext documents,69 and a 
connection to the various networks that comprise the Internet, usually 
through an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) or an Internet Access 
Provider (“IAP”).70 The Web browser will send a request from the 
“client” computer to a particular Web “server” computer using the DNS 
of the server, which on the Web is known as the Universal Resource 
Locator (“URL”),71 and then the browser will download a file from the 
Web server onto the user’s client computer which will result in a copy of 
the Web page appearing on the user’s computer screen.72 Hypertext 
Transmission Protocol (“HTTP”) “serves as the protocol for accessing 
data and traversing hypertext links” in this process.73 The user of the 
 
 69. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 108. A Web “browser” is “client software, such 
as Netscape Navigator, Mosaic, or Internet Explorer, capable of displaying documents formatted in 
‘hypertext markup language’ (‘HTML’), the standard Web formatting language.”  Shea, 930 F. 
Supp. at 929. 
 70. HABRAKEN, supra note 56, at 248-49. 
ISPs typically serve the little guy, such as a home user or small business, who wants to 
connect to the Internet and take advantage of Internet e-mail, the [Web], and other 
Internet services. . . . An IAP would be a communications company that only provides a 
connection to the Internet. The companies served by an IAP (usually larger companies 
and even ISPs) would be responsible for their own DNS servers, mail servers, and so on. 
The IAP only provides the onramp to the Internet and actually connects to the Internet 
backbone via a network access point (NAP). An [sic] NAP is a public exchange facility 
that provides connections for any number of IAPs to the Internet backbone. 
Id. at 249. 
 71. Id. at 236 (describing how a Web client computer communicates with a Web server 
computer); MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 164 (stating that Universal Resource Locators are 
known as “URLs”). In computer network lexicon: 
A client is a computer that allows a user or users to log on to a network and take 
advantage of the resources available on the network. . . . The purpose of the client is to 
get a user onto the network; therefore, client computers don’t usually have the processing 
power, the storage space, or the memory found on a server because the client does not 
have to serve up resources to other computers on the network. 
A server, on the other hand, is typically a much more powerful computer . . . . The server 
provides centralized administration of the network and serves up the resources that are 
available on the network, such as printers and files . . . . The administrator of the server 
decides who can and cannot log on to the network and which resources the various users 
can access. 
HABRAKEN, supra note 56, at 15-16. 
A URL is “an address scheme for pointing the system to a particular location within [‘the Web’] 
information space.” MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 164. “To make a long story short, the 
URL is the name that you type into your Browser address windows. DNS handles the resolution of 
the URL to an IP address.” HABRAKEN, supra at 236. Some authorities refer to the URL as the 
Uniform Resource Locator as opposed to the Universal Resource Locator. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929; 
HABRAKEN, supra at 236; COMER, supra note 31, at 528 . 
 72. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 108. 
 73. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 164. See also Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 929 
(“Because Web servers are linked to the Internet through a common communications protocol, 
known as hypertext transfer protocol (‘HTTP’), a user can move seamlessly between documents, 
regardless of their location.”); HABRAKEN, supra note 56, at 236 (stating that HTTP “is the TCP/IP 
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client computer then can click on the hypertext links embedded in the 
text of the Web page or use different functions that the Web browser 
itself provides to repeat this process and go from Web page to Web page 
or “surf” the Web.74 The ease of use of the Web largely is responsible for 
its popularity.75 Moreover, the uniform facade of the Web allows 
communications to occur anonymously because the DNS and URLs do 
not inform Web users about the physical location of both people 
accessing a Web site and people or organizations providing content on a 
Web site. This anonymity makes it difficult for both a person accessing a 
Web site or a person or organization that sponsors or operates a Web site 
to discern the specific state regulations with which they must comply. 
B.  Consequences of Operations of Internet and Web for State Regulation 
of the Internet 
The above explanation of the manner in which the Web and the 
Internet operate is important for an understanding of the specific issues 
that the Internet poses for state regulation. The manner in which the Web 
and Internet operate gives rise to two characteristics, transience and 
anonymity, that raise issues for state regulation of commercial activity on 
the Internet under the dormant commerce clause. These two 
characteristics make it burdensome for Web site operators to comply 
with different state regulations.  However, as explained below, the 
anonymity of Internet commerce can be minimized depending on the 
interactivity of the Web site or the Internet activity in which one 
engages, the type of commerce conducted over the Internet, and the 
technology available to determine the location of an Internet user. 
1.  Transience and anonymity of Internet communications 
First, the packet-switching technology and the distributed network 
that the Internet uses cause computer data to travel in a transient manner 
through state borders when any one person accesses a Web site.76 The 
 
stack member that provides the connection between an HTTP client (a computer outfitted with a 
Web browser) and server (which would be a Web server in this case)”). 
 74. See PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611, 616 (W.D. Va. 2000) (“Online users 
may also ‘surf’ the Web by ‘linking’ directly from one Web page to another.”); Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 
929 (“[W]hen a user viewing a document located on one server selects a link to a document located 
elsewhere, the browser will automatically contact the second server and display the document.”); 
CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 109-11, 113 (describing how to access Web pages by 
clicking on hypertext links, typing a URL in the location bar of a Web browser, and clicking on the 
entries of “bookmarked” Web sites). 
 75. See infra note 424 and accompanying text. 
 76. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1429. See also supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text 
(describing the packet-switched and distributed networks that the Internet uses). Some other 
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routers that transport data across the Internet and the Internet protocols 
that control the paths that routers access do not distinguish between 
geographic borders, and the paths that routers use are constantly 
changing because routers choose them according to Internet traffic at any 
particular moment in time.77 Therefore, in the process of a computer in 
one state communicating with a computer in another state, the data sent 
between the two computers can travel through an almost infinite variety 
of states.78 This transient nature of Web communication gives Web 
commerce its interstate, or even international, character, similar to a 
highway or railroad system.79 
Second, communications over the Web largely can occur 
anonymously.80 The uniform facade of the Web causes users to be 
unaware of the physical location of the computers used to transmit 
information from one location to another. This anonymity occurs from 
the vantage point of both a person accessing a Web site with a Web 
browser and a person or organization that is providing Internet content 
on a Web site. Upon accessing a Web site, the browser user has no 
knowledge of the geographic location of the server whose computer files 
the browser is accessing. The DNS and the URLs used on the Web 
simply provide a hierarchical structure for computers to translate textual 
names to IP addresses and do not necessarily correspond to any 
particular geographic location.81 Therefore, a browser user will not 
 
commentators have used the term “transience” in a slightly different manner to describe the 
constantly changing nature of Web sites. Fraser, supra note 65, at 236 (“The third important 
characteristic of the Internet is that it is constantly changing. . . . Web sites, for instance, do not 
remain static, but are constantly in a state of flux.”); Patrick Weston, American Civil Liberties Union 
of Georgia v. Miller, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 403, 410-11 (1999) (“Any web page or e-mail 
address can be changed or removed by its owner without notice to other users of the Internet. . . . 
Hence, the transient nature of the Internet can eliminate much of the evidence trail and the costs of 
physical relocation which would burden a fraudulent operation in more traditional marketplaces.”). 
 77. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text explaining how routers decide which path 
to use in transporting computer data packets. 
 78. Geist, supra note 35, at 527 (“The distributed model ensured that a single message could 
take many different routes to get from point A to point B.”); Bassinger, supra note 20, at 894 (“[T]he 
same picture sent from the same host computer to the same destination computer will likely travel a 
different route of telephone lines each time it is sent.”). 
 79. See Lanin, supra note 3, at 1429 (“The practical import of all of this is that while an 
Internet transaction is taking place, it is practically impossible geographically to locate the ingress 
and egress of the transmission.”); Bassinger, supra note 20, at 895 (“Through the use of logical 
addresses and the global network of telephone lines, the Internet abandons the traditional confines of 
physical geography in favor of a borderless world of international scope.”). 
 80. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1428 (“Particularly notable is the practical anonymity Internet 
users and hosts enjoy.”). 
 81. Id. (“[Each IP or domain name address] may provide little or no information about the 
physical and geographic location of the host computer”); Bassinger, supra note 20, at 893-94 
(“Every web site is located using a logical address that may provide little or no information about the 
physical location of that site or the entity maintaining it.”); Weston, supra note 76, at 409 (“Many e-
mail addresses and web sites contain little, if any, information that reveals the true identity or 
LOUDENSLAGER - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:05 PM 
191] STATE INTERNET REGULATION 205 
necessarily know of the physical location of a Web server from the URL 
typed into the browser or the link clicked.82 Instead, due to the 
organization of the top-level domain names, the Web user may have 
some idea of the type of entity–commercial, nonprofit or governmental–
operating the Web site being accessed.83 The location of the entity or the 
entity’s computer hardware, however, remains unknown to the browser 
user. Similarly, a person or entity that operates a Web site will not know 
automatically the geographic location of people who access the server 
that allows them to view the site.84 By itself, the transporting of computer 
data across the Web from a server to a computer using Web-browser 
software does not provide the site operator with any information about 
the location of the person using the Web browser.85 In fact, in some 
circumstances, the operator of a Web site may not even know of the 
location of the computer server that facilitates access to the Web site.86 
2.  Factors mitigating anonymity 
Several factors can mitigate the anonymous nature of Internet 
commerce. First, in a more interactive Web site, it is less likely that a 
transaction will take place anonymously, and there is more opportunity 
for the operator of the site to obtain valid information regarding the 
geographic location of the user of the site. Some Web sites are merely 
“passive” and do little more than publish information which others can 
view on the site,87 so the operator or host of the site has little or no 
opportunity to obtain information about the location of people who 
access the site. However, other sites are “interactive” and allow, or 
perhaps require, the user to exchange information with the computer 
 
physical location of their owners.”); Fraser, supra note 65, at 236 (“Web sites typically contain little 
if any indication or reference to the true identity of the individual or organization responsible for the 
site or even the physical location of the owner.”). 
 82. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1428 (“The result is that a user will not likely be able to tell which 
server is handling its transaction or where that server is.”). See also Weston, supra note 76, at 409 
(“It is quite simple for users of the Internet to communicate or exchange information anonymously 
or under a pseudonymous identity.”). 
 83. Supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (describing the Domain Name System). 
 84. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1428 (“A host computer . . . has little way of knowing who is 
logging on to its site.”); Fraser, supra note 65, at 236 (“It is relatively simple for Internet users to 
communicate or make information available anonymously or under an alias identity or ‘handle.’”). 
 85. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (describing how Internet protocols 
facilitate the transportation of computer data across the Internet). 
 86. This would be the case if the creator of the Web site utilized an ISP to create the site and 
not its own computer hardware and network. 
 87. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(describing a “passive Web site” as a site “that does little more than make information available to 
those who are interested in it”). 
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server.88 The more interactions that occur between the user and the Web 
site, the more opportunities the host or operator of the site has to obtain 
information from the user about the user’s physical location. 
Second, operators of Web sites that sell tangible goods that cannot be 
transported via the Internet, but must be shipped physically to the buyer 
in a particular geographic location, will likely know the locality of a Web 
customer.89 In such Web transactions, the host of the Web site must 
obtain accurate information about the geographic location of the buyer 
(assuming the designated shipping address corresponds with the buyer’s 
location), and the buyer has every incentive to provide the host with 
accurate shipping information in order to receive the goods purchased. 
Such Web transactions are akin to mail-order commerce that has been 
subject to state regulation for some time. 
More problematic are Web transactions that involve the sale of 
electronic goods, such as where a site user downloads software for a fee, 
or where the Web site sells services or information to the user for a fee.90 
Even operators of these Web sites, however, can use several available 
technologies to obtain the user’s geographic location if they wish to 
discover this information. Thus, an additional factor mitigating the 
anonymity of the Internet is the availability of technologies to verify 
Web users’ geographic locations. 
Even in electronic transactions, the host of the Web site must obtain 
payment from the user.91 If the user pays with a credit card, technology 
presently allows the host of the Web site to verify the user’s billing 
address.92 However, maintaining such a credit card identification system 
presently can be costly.93 A less expensive option for a Web host to 
obtain the geographic address of a user is to condition access to the Web 
 
 88. See id. (discussing “interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the 
host computer”). 
 89. See Geist, supra note 35, at 559 (“The sale of tangible products has minimal legal impact 
on the traditional buyer-seller dynamic. Notwithstanding the online character of the transaction, the 
sale of such products requires physical transportation from seller to buyer, maintaining the 
traditional customs inspection, taxation levies, and easy identification of both buyer and seller.”). 
 90. See Geist, supra note 35, at 555 (“[T]he conversion of certain goods from atoms to bits—
that is, the ability to transport products solely via the Internet—has significant implications for the 
regulatory framework for such digitized products.”). 
 91. Although a Web site operator may not be willing to take a check as payment, if the buyer 
pays with a check, the host will learn of the location of the user upon receipt of the check via the 
United States Postal Service. 
 92. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
110 YALE L.J. 785, 810 (2001). 
 93. Id. The possibility also exists that the user accesses the Web site from a computer located 
in a state other than the state indicated in their billing address, “[b]ut this will very much be the 
exception rather than the rule.” Id. 
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site on the user providing a personal identification number (“PIN”).94 A 
Web host can get software for such a system free of charge from several 
firms.95 “To obtain an adult PIN, one must pay by credit card online, or 
fax or mail an application and a check and a copy of a passport or 
driver’s license” to the entity running the identification site.96 While 
“[t]he online process [only] takes a few minutes, “97 this process does 
require the potential user of the site to spend some time, minimal as it 
might be, obtaining the PIN and spending money for the PIN.98 Some 
potential users also may not want to disclose the personal information 
required to obtain a PIN.99 Any of these factors may dissuade some 
potential users from accessing the Web site and its goods or services.100 
However, it is important to recognize that such technology is available 
and that its use simply increases the costs to the user or the host of the 
Web site of engaging in commerce over the site.101 
A developing technology also holds promise for allowing hosts of 
Web sites to determine the geographic location of users. This technology 
uses “software with algorithms that identify the geographical source of 
[the] IP address” of the user’s computer instantly.102 This technology 
would allow the host of the Web site to obtain the user’s geographic 
 
 94. Id. at 809. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 809 n.103. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 810. Some firms, though, apparently “are . . . beginning to offer the . . . PINs for 
free.” Id. at 809. 
 99. Id. at 810. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 809. Another option, albeit less attractive to potential site users due to the increased 
time it would take to access the Web site, would be to require users of the site to first provide their 
postal address. Then the host could send the user an access code through the United States Postal 
Service. Upon receipt of the access code in the mail, the person could access the site. The advantage 
to this means of verifying a user’s address is that it relies on presently available technology and is 
very accurate. One disadvantage to this process is that it greatly reduces the speed at which an 
Internet transaction can take place, taking away one of the main appeals of conducting commerce 
over the Internet. Again, similar to the use of a PIN, the slowing down of the transaction as well as 
requiring the divulgence of personal information may dissuade some people from using the Web 
site. This process also would increase the costs to the host of the Web site because the host would 
have to pay for postage, envelopes, paper and so on. 
 102. Id. at 810. 
The algorithms determine the geographical identity of the content receiver by cross-
comparing results from (1) mapping of IP addresses in the content receiver’s header with 
IP address databases, and (2) a tracer analysis of the path of the Internet transmission, 
which is checked against a database of the nodes through which the transmission traveled 
and their geographic location. While neither method, taken alone, is sufficiently accurate, 
redundant cross-referencing of these databases holds the promise to be extraordinarily 
accurate. This software can be installed in the content provider’s webpage, allowing the 
provider to tailor content to comply with differing regulations in each geographical unit. 
Id. at 810-11. 
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information without the time and privacy costs to the user described 
above.103 However, this technology presently is “significantly more 
expensive” to hosts than requiring the use of PINs and is accurate “at the 
state level only eighty to ninety-five percent of the time.”104 However, 
one set of commentators proclaims, “there is good reason to believe that 
geographical identification technology will be precise and inexpensive in 
the near future.”105 
III.  SUPREME COURT DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The transience and anonymity of Internet communications make it 
difficult under the dormant commerce clause for states to protect against 
the harms that the Internet brings and to further the legitimate interests of 
the states. In order to understand how these characteristics of the Internet 
pose difficulties for state Internet regulation under the Commerce Clause, 
it is important to have some background on the policies behind the 
recognition of the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause, to 
understand the basic test that the United States Supreme Court applies in 
cases implicating this doctrine, and to understand how the Supreme 
Court has applied this test in some specific circumstances. Because some 
courts have asserted that the transience and anonymity of Internet 
communications cause states’ Internet regulations to operate 
extraterritorially, this section briefly examines cases dealing with state 
regulations that allegedly operate extraterritorially.  Some courts have 
also analogized Internet regulations to regulations of interstate 
transportation, so this section also discusses Supreme Court cases dealing 
with interstate transportation regulations. 
A.  Initial Recognition of the Dormant Aspect of the Commerce Clause 
and the Policies Behind Its Adoption 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Commerce 
Clause has a dormant aspect that restricts the ability of the States to 
regulate interstate commerce even in the absence of federal legislation.106 
The Commerce Clause was written in order to avoid the “Balkanization” 
of the United States economy that resulted after the institution of the 
Articles of Confederation.107 The country’s experience after the 
 
 103. Id. at 811. 
 104. Id. “[T]hese geographical identification technologies [also] can presently be defeated by 
Internet anonymizers, remote sessions via Telnet, and remote dial-up connections.” Id. 
 105. Id. at 812. 
 106. See infra notes 107-133 and accompanying text. 
 107. South Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984) (“The Commerce 
Clause was designed ‘to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued 
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enactment of the Articles of Confederation emphasized the importance of 
the federal government being able to act in areas that affected the 
economic well being of the nation as a whole.108 Conversely, under the 
Constitution, states and their citizens also retained all powers not 
expressly given to the federal government.109 Among the powers that the 
states retained were their “police powers,” which included the ability to 
regulate activities that affected the health, safety, security and general 
welfare of their residents.110 Thus, in the absence of Congressional 
 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”) 
(quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)); ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 18, at 
133 (“[T]he rationale of the commerce clause was to create and foster the development of a common 
market among the states, eradicating internal trade barriers, and prohibiting the economic 
Balkanization of the Union.”); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. 
L. REV. 125, 131 (stating that the nation’s “free trade unit can be maintained only if the states are 
barred from enacting laws that are designed to raise the relative prices of, or decrease the share of 
the local market obtained by, out-of-state goods”). 
 108. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (“Under the Articles of 
Confederation, state taxes and duties hindered and suppressed interstate commerce; the Framers 
intended the Commerce Clause as a cure for these structural ills.”); Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 
U.S. 34, 43-44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting) (“[T]he purpose of the commerce clause was not to 
preclude all state regulation of commerce crossing state lines but to prevent discrimination and the 
erection of barriers or obstacles to the free flow of commerce, interstate or foreign.”); William Lee 
Biddle, Comment, State Regulation of the Internet: Where Does the Balance of Federalist Power 
Lie?, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 161, 164 (2000) (“The main intention of the Commerce Clause was to 
solve the problem of a State enacting laws impacting trade with other states or with foreign nations, 
such as duties and tariffs.”). 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend X (stating that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people”). See also Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 592 (“Congress’s enumerated powers in 
article I, section 8, when read in conjunction with the terms of the supremacy clause, make clear that 
those powers neither expressly nor conditionally denied to the states may be exercised by them, 
subject to reversal or preemption by legislation enacted pursuant to one of Congress’s enumerated 
powers.”). “[The Framers] envisioned a federalist system, a system where power would be divided 
among the state and federal governments so as to allow the inherent benefits of both while 
preventing either from oppressing the other.” Lawrence, supra note 18, at 401 n.25. 
 110. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (“As long as a State does not needlessly 
obstruct interstate trade or attempt to ‘place itself in a position of economic isolation,’ it retains 
broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its 
natural resources.”) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)); H.P. Hood & 
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949) (recognizing the “broad power in the State to 
protect its inhabitants against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards even 
by use of measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce”); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 
92 U.S. 259, 271 (1875) (describing a state’s “police power” as those powers “for the preservation of 
good order, of the health and comfort of the citizens, and their protection against pauperism and 
against contagious and infectious diseases, and other matters of legislation of like character”); New 
York  v. Miln, 36 U.S. (10 Pet.) 102, 133 (1837) (stating that “the powers reserved to the several 
states, will extend to all the objects, which in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, 
liberties, and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the 
state”). See also Lawrence, supra note 18, at 418 n.102 (“The Court has long recognized the idea 
that States have an inherent ‘police power’ that allows them to regulate for the health, safety, and 
welfare of its [sic] citizens.”). “Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as 
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regulation of a particular commercial activity, the courts are left to 
balance the need for laws that allow commerce to freely occur between 
the states against the power of the states to regulate matters that affect 
the health, safety, and security of their citizens.111 
This tension between these two important interests has been apparent 
since the Supreme Court began formulating its dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence. In Gibbons v. Ogden,112 the Court stated that the United 
States Congress and the state legislatures could not concurrently hold the 
power to regulate commerce because state regulation would subsume the 
power that the Commerce Clause grants to Congress.113 In this way, a 
state’s regulation of commerce, as the Commerce Clause defines that 
term,114 is inconsistent with the affirmative grant of power to Congress in 
the Commerce Clause.115 However, Gibbons v. Ogden dealt with a 
situation where a state law was in direct conflict with a federal law, and 
therefore, the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause was not at 
issue.116 Instead, the Court, in effect, held that the federal statute 
preempted the state law.117 Justice Johnson, however, stated in a 
concurring opinion that even if Congress repealed the federal law 
concerned in the case, the state regulation at issue would still be 
invalid.118 His belief was based on the context in which the Constitution 
was created: “If there was any one object riding over every other in the 
 
well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, 
ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824). 
 111. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-37 (1989) (stating that “[t]he principles 
guiding” the Court’s assessment of state statutes under the Commerce Clause “reflect the 
Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by 
state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States 
within their respective spheres.”) (citations omitted); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 533 (“This 
distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety 
and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power 
to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply 
rooted in both our history and our law.”); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945) 
(“[B]etween these extremes lies the infinite variety of cases in which regulation of local matters may 
also operate as a regulation of commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state 
and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing 
demands of the state and national interests involved.”). 
 112. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 113. Id. at 199-200. 
 114. The Commerce Clause applies to “commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 115. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 199-200. 
 116. Id. at 200. 
 117. Id. at 210, 221. “In one case and the other, the acts of New York must yield to the law of 
Congress; and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer against a right given by a law of the 
Union, must be erroneous.” Id. at 210. “[T]he act of a State inhibiting the use of either [navigable 
waters and ports] to any vessel having a license under the act of Congress, comes, we think, in direct 
collision with that act.” Id. at 221. 
 118. Id. at 231-32 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
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adoption of the constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse 
among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints [imposed 
by state governments.]”119 
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also recognized that the states’ 
police powers allowed states to pass legislation regulating matters 
concerning the health and safety of their residents even when those 
matters may affect commerce. In Gibbons v. Ogden, the majority opinion 
acknowledged that the power that the Commerce Clause invests in 
Congress does not deprive the states of their “police powers” which 
allow the states to regulate the health and safety of their residents.120 “No 
direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress; and, 
consequently, they remain subject to State legislation.”121 Moreover, the 
Court implied that states could pass legislation regulating commerce as 
long as the legislation is not contrary to federal legislation.122 
In Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.,123 in which the dormant 
aspect of the Commerce Clause was at issue, the Court upheld a 
Delaware statute that authorized the construction of a dam across a creek, 
even though it obstructed federally licensed boats in their navigation of 
the creek.124 The owners of a boat that had been sued for damaging the 
dam argued that the Commerce Clause included power over navigation 
of rivers and deprived Delaware of the power to close a “navigable 
river.”125 Chief Justice Marshall, writing the opinion of the Court, found 
that the dam enhanced the value of property on the banks of the creek 
and that “the health of the inhabitants probably [had been] improved.”126 
Chief Justice Marshall then recognized, “[m]easures calculated to 
produce these objects, provided they do not come into collision with the 
powers of the general government, are undoubtedly within those which 
are reserved to the states.”127 Thus, the Court held that “[t]he power 
given by the constitution to congress to regulate commerce,” in the 
 
 119. Id. at 231 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 120. See id. at 203 (“Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as 
well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, 
ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass [of laws not surrendered to the federal government].”). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 408-09 (“Chief Justice Marshall suggested that States may 
sometimes enact laws to regulate commerce, as long as the regulation does not interfere with, or is 
not contrary to, an Act of Congress passed pursuant to the Constitution.”). 
 123. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). 
 124. Id. at 249-50. 
 125. Id. at 248. 
 126. Id. at 248. 
 127. Id. 
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absence of conflicting federal legislation, did not invalidate the Delaware 
statute authorizing the erection of the dam.128 
The Supreme Court also recognized the states’ police powers in New 
York v. Miln.129 In Miln, a New York statute required ships arriving in 
New York City to provide the mayor of New York with a report listing 
all of the people that the ship had brought from foreign countries and 
other states.130 The Court held that the statute did not violate the dormant 
commerce clause because New York had enacted the statute under the 
authority of its police power.131 “[I]t is not only the right, but the 
bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happiness and 
prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any 
and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these 
ends.”132 The Court reasoned that in enacting the statute, New York was 
protecting itself from “the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and 
possibly convicts” and “the evil of thousands of foreign emigrants 
arriving [in New York], and the consequent danger of her citizens being 
subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance of those who are 
poor.”133 Thus, even as early as 1837, the Court recognized that state 
legislation enacted through its police powers could pass muster under 
dormant commerce clause analysis even when the statute directly 
regulated foreign commerce. One could theorize that such a statute 
would not pass Constitutional muster today.134 However, Miln still is 
important in that it indicates just how deferential to a state’s exercise of 
its police powers the Supreme Court was when first delineating the 
boundaries of the dormant commerce clause and how reluctant the Court 
was to invalidate state laws that concern such powers, even when the 
exercise of those powers affected interstate commerce. In fact, all of 
these early cases demonstrate that, upon first recognition of the dormant 
aspect of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court showed deference to 
the states’ powers to protect the health and welfare of their residents. 
 
 128. Id. at 249-50. See also Lawrence, supra note 18, at 409 (stating that in Willson “the Court 
held that in the absence of a conflicting Act of Congress, States may regulate pursuant to the police 
power activities affecting interstate commerce”). 
 129. 36 U.S. (10 Pet.) 102 (1837). 
 130. Id. at 130-31. 
 131. Id. at 139-43. 
 132. Id. at 139. 
 133. Id. at 141-42. 
 134. See Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273-75 (1875) (invalidating, under the 
dormant commerce clause, New York and Louisiana statutes that required boat owners to either 
provide a large bond or pay a smaller lump sum for each passenger from a foreign country or another 
state); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 572-73 (1849) (invalidating as unconstitutional New 
York and Massachusetts statutes requiring the payment of specified sums of money for each boat 
passenger on boats arriving from ports outside of each respective state). 
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B.  The Modern Dormant Commerce Clause Test: Balancing the Local 
Benefits Against the Burdens to Interstate Commerce 
Early on, in analyzing the competing state and national interests in 
dormant commerce clause cases, the Court distinguished between 
activities of a national nature “demanding a single uniform rule” and 
those of a distinctly local nature requiring diverse regulation by the 
states.135 The Court introduced this analysis in Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia. 136 One set of commentators has 
noted that this “approach simultaneously avoided confrontation with 
states’ rights advocates, yet reserved for the Court the ability to 
invalidate objectionable state legislation under a theory” that the power 
to regulate interstate commerce was partially exclusive to Congress.137 
This distinction has now given way to a test that balances the state 
regulation’s local benefits against the burden the regulation places on 
interstate commerce.138 “The Court’s reasoning in Cooley endures [in its 
dormant commerce clause jurisprudence], however, in the sense that the 
resolution of a particular case today will turn in large part on a 
consideration of the local (state) interest in regulating local affairs as it 
relates to the national interest in promoting interstate commerce.”139 
The Court’s modern test balances these interests in a slightly 
different and less formalistic manner though. Basically, when facially 
nondiscriminatory legislation is concerned, the Court weighs the putative 
benefits of the state regulation against the burden that the statute places 
on interstate commerce: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
 
 135. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Phila., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
 136. Id. See also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 18, at 139-40 (stating that Cooley 
distinguished between “those subjects of commerce which demand a uniform rule throughout the 
country and those subjects which permit diversity of treatment in order to fulfill local needs” and 
that Cooley “set the direction for commerce clause adjudication for almost the next 100 years”); 
Lawrence, supra note 18, at 409 (stating that in Cooley “the Court attempted to merge its previous 
dormant-commerce-clause holdings into a single doctrine standing for the proposition that, in the 
absence of conflicting congressional action, States may regulate those aspects of interstate 
commerce that are so local as to require diverse treatment, whereas Congress alone may regulate 
those aspects of the same that require a single, uniform rule”). One set of commentators has asserted 
that in Cooley the Court effectively subsumed the role of Congress in applying dormant commerce 
clause analysis to state regulations. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 109, at 581 (“Under Cooley, 
when Congress has not regulated the objects of commerce in question, the Court itself determines 
whether the nature of the commerce requires exclusive federal regulation. Thus, the Court, in testing 
state legislation, essentially makes what amounts to an intrinsically legislative determination as to 
whether a particular type of commerce requires exclusive federal regulation.”). 
 137. Redish & Nugent, supra note 109, at 579. 
 138. See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text. 
 139. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 410. 
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imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefits.”140 
Conversely, the Court has stated that state regulations that directly or 
facially discriminate against interstate commerce are a “per se” violation 
of the Commerce Clause.141 At least one commentator, though, has 
suggested that even state statutes that directly discriminate against 
interstate commerce are subject to a balancing test but that such statutes 
must show an incredibly strong state interest that can be accomplished by 
almost no other manner of regulation.142 The Court has recognized that: 
[T]here is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is 
virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category 
subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach. In either 
situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on 
both local and interstate activity.143 
Thus, at base, the Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause analysis 
always involves balancing the benefits of the state regulation against the 
burdens that the regulation will cause to interstate commerce. 
 
 140. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). In Pike, the Court went on to 
explain that once the Court determines that the “local purpose” is “legitimate,” “the extent of the 
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and 
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” Id. at 142. See 
also Tushnet, supra note 107, at 131 (“Beyond the proscription of purposeful discrimination, the 
commerce clause has been held to authorize judicial invalidation of state laws that unduly burden 
interstate commerce.”). 
 141. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) 
(“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its 
effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck 
down the statute without further inquiry.”). See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 87 
(1987) (“The principal objects of dormant commerce clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate 
against interstate commerce.”); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (“Neither 
the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect 
of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of another state or the 
labor of its residents.”). 
 142. See Lawrence, supra note 18, at 426-27 (“If the statute discriminates on its face, . . . it is 
considered to be virtually per se invalid. At this point, the State may overcome the heavy 
presumption of invalidity only upon a showing that the measure is virtually certain to achieve the 
legitimate purpose and that the purpose could not be served as well by available less discriminatory 
means.”) (citations omitted). See also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 340 (1989) (“[T]his Court 
has followed a consistent practice of striking down state statutes that clearly discriminate against 
interstate commerce, unless that discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated 
to economic protectionism.”) (citations omitted); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) 
(upholding Maine statute that prohibited the importation of live baitfish into Maine from out of 
state). “A facially discriminatory measure is not absolutely per-se [sic] invalid because it is at least 
remotely possible that a facially discriminatory statute may have a nondiscriminatory purpose.” 
Lawrence, supra note 18, at 426 n.137. 
 143. Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579. 
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C.  The Extraterritorial Effect Cases 
The Supreme Court treats state regulations that have the effect, 
intended or not, of regulating commerce that occurs “wholly outside of 
the State’s borders” as per se violations of the Commerce Clause.144 
However, some cases analyzing whether a statute had an extraterritorial 
effect still have engaged in the balancing analysis described above and 
weighed the state interests promoted by the statute against the burdens 
that the statute placed on interstate commerce.145 Nevertheless, the 
“critical inquiry” in such cases “is whether the practical effect of the 
regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”146 
[T]he practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by 
considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by 
considering how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate 
regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not 
one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation. Generally 
speaking, the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent 
legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime 
into the jurisdiction of another State.147 
The Supreme Court generally has analyzed whether a state statute 
regulates extraterritorially in a few particular circumstances. One specific 
area in which the Court has examined these principles is price-
affirmation statutes.148 These statutes usually required liquor distributors 
to affirm that the prices charged in the particular state concerned were no 
 
 144. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion). See also Healy, 
491 U.S. at 336 (“[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside of the 
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority and is invalid 
regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature.”). 
 145. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643-46 (analyzing under the Pike test an Illinois statute regulating 
tender offers for corporate stock of corporations of which Illinois stockholders held a 10 per cent 
ownership interest and stating that “even when a state statute regulates interstate commerce 
indirectly, the burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in relation to the local 
interests served by the statute”). This portion of the Edgar opinion was the only portion joined in by 
a majority of the Court. See also CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89-93 (weighing the interest of Indiana in 
regulating the shareholder rights of corporations created under Indiana law against the burden such 
regulation had on interstate commerce). 
 146. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336. 
 147. Id. at 336-37. 
 148. See id. at 326, 335-341 (invalidating Connecticut statute requiring out-of-state beer 
shippers to affirm that the price charged to Connecticut wholesalers, at the time of posting, was no 
higher than the price charged in the states bordering Connecticut); Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 575, 
582-84 (invalidating New York statute requiring liquor producers to affirm that the price charged to 
New York wholesalers was “no higher than the lowest price” charged to wholesalers anywhere else 
in the United States); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966) (upholding a 
New York statute requiring liquor-label owners to affirm that the price of their liquor in New York 
was no higher than the lowest price at which their liquor was sold in the United States in the 
preceding month). 
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higher than those charged in other states.149 An example of such a case is 
Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc.150 In Healy, Connecticut’s affirmation statute 
required out-of-state beer shippers to affirm that the price they charged in 
Connecticut, at the time of posting the price, was no higher than the price 
in the states bordering Connecticut.151 The Court found that the 
Connecticut affirmation statute had an extraterritorial effect because in 
conjunction with Massachusetts’ pricing regulations with regard to beer, 
the statute “‘prospectively’ preclude[d] the alteration of out-of-state 
prices after the moment of affirmation.”152 Thus, the statute “prevent[ed] 
brewers from undertaking competitive pricing in Massachusetts based on 
prevailing market conditions” because in setting the Massachusetts price, 
the brewer also had to take into account what price it wanted to charge in 
Connecticut.153 The Court also examined what would occur if several 
states enacted legislation similar to Connecticut and found that “[t]he 
short-circuiting of normal pricing decisions based on local conditions 
would be carried to a national scale.”154 The Court found that the 
Commerce Clause reserves this type of regional and national “pricing 
mechanism for goods” to the federal government and that states cannot 
achieve this “piecemeal through the extraterritorial reach of individual 
state statutes.”155 Therefore, the Court held that the Connecticut statute 
was invalid under the Commerce Clause.156 
Another area in which the Court has examined the potential 
extraterritorial effect of state statutes is state regulation of corporate 
stock and shareholders’ rights. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Court 
invalidated an Illinois statute that halted tender offers for up to 20 days 
and allowed the Illinois Secretary of State “to adjudicate the substantive 
fairness of the offer.”157 The statute applied to takeover offers for 
 
 149. See, e.g., Healy, 491 U.S. at 326 (requiring out-of-state beer shippers to affirm that the 
price charged to Connecticut wholesalers, at the time of posting, was no higher than the price 
charged in the states bordering Connecticut); Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 575 (requiring liquor 
producers to affirm that the price charged to New York wholesalers was “no higher than the lowest 
price” charged to wholesalers anywhere else in the United States). 
 150. 491 U.S. 324 (1989). 
 151. Id. at 326. 
 152. Id. at 338. Massachusetts required “brewers to post their prices on the first day of the 
month to become effective on the first day of the following month,” while Connecticut required 
brewers five days later to affirm their prices in Connecticut for the following month. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 340. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 337. The Court also held that the Connecticut statute on its face discriminated 
“against brewers and shippers of beer engaged in interstate commerce” because the statute only 
applied to interstate brewers and shippers of beer and would not have applied to brewers that only 
sold beer in Connecticut. Id. at 340-41. 
 157. 457 U.S. 624, 627, 646 (1982). 
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corporations when “shareholders located in Illinois own[ed] 10% of the 
class of equity securities subject to the offer.”158 A plurality of the Court 
found that the statute “directly regulate[d] transactions which take place 
across state lines, even if [occurring] wholly outside of the State of 
Illinois.”159 The communication of tender offers uses interstate facilities 
“which, if accepted, would result in transactions occurring across state 
lines,” and the statute sought to prevent entities from making tender 
offers to people living outside of and not connected with Illinois.160 
Therefore, the plurality found that the Illinois statute directly restrained 
interstate commerce and had “a sweeping extraterritorial effect.”161 The 
plurality found that allowing Illinois and other states to regulate tender 
offers in such a manner would stifle interstate securities transactions 
initiated through tender offers.162 
A majority of the Court found the Illinois statute unconstitutional 
under the Pike balancing test. The majority portion of the opinion 
explained that the Illinois statute burdened interstate commerce by giving 
“Illinois the power to determine whether a tender offer may proceed 
anywhere” in the United States.163 This led to many “substantial” effects 
including depriving shareholders “of the opportunity to sell their shares 
at a premium,” as well as hindering “[t]he reallocation of economic 
resources to their highest valued use” and reducing the incentive 
provided by tender offers for “incumbent management to perform well so 
that stock prices remain high.”164 On the other hand, the Court found that 
“there [was] nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law” 
because “the State [had] no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident 
shareholders.”165 Moreover, the Court was not convinced that the statute 
enhanced the position of shareholders because the statute provided 
similar protections to those already afforded by federal law.166 Thus, the 
 
 158. Id. at 627. The statute alternatively applied to corporations when two of the following 
three conditions were met: (1) the principal executive office of the corporation was in Illinois, (2) the 
corporation was organized under Illinois law, or (3) “at least 10% of [the corporation’s] stated 
capital and paid-in surplus” was “represented” in Illinois. Id. 
 159. Id. at 641. 
 160. Id. at 642. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 643. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 644 (the Court recognized that there was a state interest, but the state interest only 
balanced against the resident shareholders, not non-resident shareholders). 
 166. Id. Furthermore, the Court found “incredible” Illinois’ contention that the statute allowed 
it to regulate the internal affairs of corporations formed under Illinois law because the regulations 
could apply “to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have their principal place of 
business in other States.” Id. at 645. “Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of 
foreign corporations.” Id. at 645-46. 
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Court held that the statute was “invalid under the Commerce Clause” 
because the “substantial burden” placed on interstate commerce 
outweighed “its putative local benefits.”167 
Conversely, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., the Court upheld an 
Indiana statute that required “a majority vote of all disinterested 
shareholders” in order for a person or entity acquiring “control shares” of 
a corporation to acquire voting rights for that stock despite allegations 
that the statute had extraterritorial effect.168 The statute applied only to a 
business incorporated under Indiana law that had “one hundred (100) or 
more shareholders,” that had “its principal place of business, its principal 
office, or substantial assets within Indiana,” and that met one of three 
different thresholds of stock held by shareholders resident in Indiana.169 
In analyzing the statute under the Commerce Clause, the Court first 
found that the Indiana statute did not discriminate against interstate 
commerce because the statute treated both Indiana residents and non-
residents that made tender offers in the same manner.170 Second, the 
Court found that the statute did not subject interstate commerce to 
inconsistent regulations because the Indiana statute only applied to 
businesses incorporated under Indiana law.171 If each state only regulates 
the voting rights in corporations created under that state’s laws, “each 
corporation will be subject to the law of only one State.”172 The Court 
also noted that “[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more 
firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic 
corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of 
shareholders.”173 
Third, in balancing the effect of the statute on interstate commerce 
against the state interests promoted by the statute, the Court recognized 
the states’ traditional and accepted “regulation of corporate governance” 
as the “regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a 
product of state law.”174 The Court explained that it “is an accepted part 
of the business landscape in this country for States” to define the rights 
of shareholders in corporations created under their laws.175 Moreover, the 
 
 167. Id. at 646. 
 168. 481 U.S. 69, 73-74, 94 (1987) (citations omitted). 
 169. Id. at 73. 
 170. Id. at 87. 
 171. Id. at 89. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 89-90. 
 175. Id. at 91. The Court even stated that the “beneficial free market system depends at its core 
upon the fact that a corporation—except in the rarest situations—is organized under, and governed 
by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its incorporation.” 
Id. at 90. 
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Court found that “a State has an interest in promoting stable relationships 
among parties involved in the corporations” created by its laws “as well 
as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice 
in corporate affairs.”176 While Indiana would have “no interest in 
protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations,” the 
Indiana statute applied “only to corporations incorporated in Indiana.”177 
The Court found that “Indiana ha[d] a substantial interest in preventing 
the corporate form from becoming a shield for unfair business 
dealing.”178 Therefore, the Court held that “the limited extent that the Act 
affects interstate commerce” was “justified by the State’s interests in 
defining the attributes of shares in its corporations and in protecting 
shareholders.”179 These cases dealing with allegations of statutes having 
extraterritorial effect demonstrate that the Court often uses the Pike 
balancing test to resolve such situations and that in examining such 
statutes the Court still considers whether a state is exercising one of its 
traditional police powers. 
D.  The Transportation Cases 
Another group of Supreme Court cases has dealt specifically with 
state regulation of the United States railroad and highway systems. These 
decisions have become known as the “transportation cases,” and some 
courts dealing with state regulation of the Internet have cited them for the 
proposition that certain areas of regulation are so integral to interstate 
commerce that they require the uniformity throughout the country that 
only federal legislation can provide.180 Summing up these cases in such 
cursory fashion, though, greatly oversimplifies the Court’s analysis in 
these cases. The Court in these cases did not stake out the railroad and 
highway systems as “national preserves” that the states were not to 
touch, but instead engaged in the balancing analysis described in Pike 
 
 176. Id. at 91. 
 177. Id. at 93. 
 178. Id. Furthermore, the Court distinguished the Indiana statute from the Illinois statute in 
Edgar because the Indiana statute applied “only to corporations that have a substantial number of 
shareholders in Indiana” and, therefore, “every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial 
number of Indiana residents.” Id. 
 179. Id. at 94. 
 180. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999) (“As we observed, supra, 
certain types of commerce have been recognized as requiring national regulation.”); Am. Libraries 
Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The courts have long recognized that 
certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation 
only on a national level.”). However, this proposition begs the question because the task left to the 
court in almost every dormant commerce clause case is to distinguish between activities of a national 
nature “demanding a single uniform rule” and those of a local nature requiring diverse regulation by 
the states. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Phila., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
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Church, weighing the putative local benefits of the state law at issue 
against the burden that the law placed on interstate commerce.181 
In fact, especially in the area of regulation of interstate highway 
safety, the Court has recognized the states’ ability to regulate matters that 
affect interstate commerce.182 In South Carolina State Highway 
Department v. Barnwell Bros., the Court explained: 
Few subjects of state regulation are so peculiarly of local concern as is 
the use of state highways. There are few [activities], local regulation of 
which is so inseparable from a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce. Unlike the railroads, local highways are built, owned, and 
maintained by the state or its municipal subdivisions. The state has a 
primary and immediate concern in their safe and economical 
administration. . . . 
 From the beginning it has been recognized that a state can, if it sees 
fit, build and maintain its own highways, canals and railroads and that 
in the absence of Congressional action their regulation is peculiarly 
within its competence, even though interstate commerce is materially 
affected.183 
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., the Court stated that “[t]he 
power of the State to regulate the use of its highways is broad and 
pervasive” and that the Court had upheld state statutes in this area 
“applicable alike to interstate and intrastate commerce, despite the fact 
that they may have an impact on interstate commerce.”184 More recently, 
the Court recognized that “[i]n no field has this deference to state 
regulation been greater than that of highway safety regulation” and that 
“those who would challenge state regulations said to promote highway 
safety must overcome a ‘strong presumption of [their] validity.’”185 
 
 181. See Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978) (“Our recent decisions 
make clear that the inquiry necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of 
the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of interstate 
commerce.”); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959) (“Unless we can 
conclude on the whole record that ‘the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing 
accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in 
keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it’ we must uphold the 
statute.”) (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945)); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 
U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945) (“[T]he matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of 
the burden which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on 
interstate commerce and . . . the relative weights of the state and national interests involved.”). 
 182. See Lawrence, supra note 18, at 430 (stating that “the Supreme Court has long accepted 
the proposition that States may regulate their transportation facilities as long as the legislative intent 
was to protect public safety.”). 
 183. 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938). 
 184. 359 U.S. at 523. 
 185. Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443-44 (quoting Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524). 
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“[R]egulations that touch on safety – especially highway safety – are 
those that ‘the Court has been most reluctant to invalidate.’”186 
In light of the Court’s deference to state regulation of highways, it 
should not be surprising that the Court has, at times, upheld state statutes 
regulating this area that affected interstate commerce. For example, in 
South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., the Court 
upheld a South Carolina statute that prohibited the use on its highways of 
trucks exceeding 90 inches in width and 20,000 pounds in weight.187 As 
mentioned above, the Court acknowledged the deference due a state’s 
regulation of its highways and that “regulations of the use of the 
highways are akin to local regulation of rivers, harbors, piers, and docks, 
quarantine regulations, and game laws, which, Congress not acting, have 
been sustained even though they materially interfere with interstate 
commerce.”188 The Court emphasized that it was Congress’s role to 
“determine whether the burdens imposed on [interstate commerce] by 
state regulation, otherwise permissible, are too great” and whether to 
pass federal legislation “to secure uniformity or in other respects to 
protect the national interest in the commerce.”189 In contrast, the 
judiciary’s role “stops with the inquiry” of whether the state “has acted 
within its province, and whether the means of regulation are reasonably 
adapted to the end sought.”190 Finding that “it [was not] possible to say 
that the legislative choice [was] without rational basis,” the Court upheld 
the South Carolina highway width and weight requirements for trucks.191 
As one commentator has set out, under the Barnwell formulation, the 
Court will give a large amount of deference to the state regulation “as 
long as the State acts within its established police power right to regulate 
motor vehicles for safety purposes,” and will overturn the state 
legislature’s decision “only if the regulation is not plausibly ‘reasonably 
related’ to the safety goal.”192 
One of two circumstances usually has existed when the Supreme 
Court has applied the dormant commerce clause to invalidate state 
regulation of railways or highways: (1) the state regulation at issue is 
widely out of step with most other states’ regulation of the subject 
matter, even conflicting with other states’ regulations in some instances, 
and compliance can only come at great expense, or (2) the state’s 
 
 186. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (quoting Raymond, 434 
U.S. at 443). 
 187. 303 U.S. at 180, 195. 
 188. Id. at 187-88. 
 189. Id. at 189-190. 
 190. Id. at 190. 
 191. Id. at 192. 
 192. Lawrence, supra note 18, at 431. 
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motivation in enacting the regulation appears to have been, at least in 
part, to discriminate against interstate commerce or advance local 
interests at the expense of out of state interests.193 However, the 
invalidation of state regulations under these circumstances is not peculiar 
to the transportation arena. Any state regulation, regardless of the area 
concerned, presenting either of these two circumstances generally is ripe 
for invalidation.194 
An example of the first circumstance existed in Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Arizona.195 In Southern Pacific, the Court invalidated an Arizona 
regulation that prohibited the operation of passenger trains longer than 
fourteen cars long and freight trains longer than seventy cars long.196 At 
the time of the case, “seventy freight car laws” were only enforced in two 
states, including Arizona, and Arizona was the only state with “a 
fourteen car passenger car limit.”197 Furthermore, the Court found that 
compliance with Arizona’s car limit law cost the two railroads that 
operated in the state “$1,000,000 a year” in 1940s dollars,198 imposing “a 
serious burden on the interstate commerce conducted by” those 
railroads.199 
Similarly, in Bibb, the Supreme Court held that an Illinois statute 
conflicted with the Commerce Clause when the statute prohibited the use 
of a straight mudflap, which was legal in “at least 45 States,” on trucks or 
trailers.200 The Court distinguished this statute from the statute at issue in 
Barnwell Bros. because the Illinois statute conflicted with Arkansas 
regulations that required trailers to have straight mudflaps.201 The Court 
further found that the Illinois statute “seriously interfere[d] with the 
‘interline’ operations of motor carriers—that is to say, with the 
interchanging of trailers between an originating carrier and another 
carrier when the latter serves an area not served by the former.”202 This 
“massive showing of burden on interstate commerce” made the Illinois 
 
 193. See infra notes 195-227 and accompanying text. 
 194. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 109, at 598 (“When, one might ask, are state 
regulations likely to impose an undue burden? The answer is, when state regulations differ markedly 
from the regulations imposed by its neighboring states, for it is then that those moving in interstate 
commerce would have to adjust each time they crossed a new state line.”); Lawrence, supra note 18, 
at 419 (asserting that the Court effectively treats as per se invalid state regulations enacted with the 
purpose of discriminating against interstate commerce). 
 195. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
 196. Id. at 763, 781-82. 
 197. Id. at 774. 
 198. Id. at 772. 
 199. Id. at 773. 
 200. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523, 529-30 (1959). 
 201. Id. at 526-27. 
 202. Id. at 527. 
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statute “one of those cases – few in number – where local safety 
measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce.”203 “A state which insists on a design out of line 
with the requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes place 
a great burden of delay and inconvenience on those interstate motor 
carriers entering or crossing its territory.”204 In this case, the Court held 
that Illinois’ showing of the safety merits of the statute was “far too 
inconclusive” to outweigh “the heavy burden” that it placed on interstate 
commerce.205 
Finally, Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice206 and Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp.207 provide examples of the Court’s 
invalidation of state statutes regulating highway traffic due, at least in 
part, to states attempting to advance in-state interests at the expense of 
out-of-state interests.208 In Raymond, the Wisconsin statute at issue set a 
limit of 55 feet on the length of vehicles pulling one trailer, and any 
person desiring to operate a “single-trailer unit” longer than this had to 
obtain a permit from the Wisconsin Highway Commission.209 Wisconsin 
law also required people who wished to pull more than one trailer 
through the state to obtain a permit.210 The plaintiffs to the lawsuit had 
applied to Wisconsin officials “for annual permits to operate 65-foot 
doubles” within Wisconsin.211  State officials denied their permits 
because their “proposed operations were not within the narrow scope of 
the administrative regulations that specif[ied] when ‘trailer train’ permits 
[would] be issued.”212 The Court noted that “Wisconsin’s regulatory 
scheme contain[ed] a great number of exceptions to the general rule that 
vehicles over 55 feet long cannot be operated on highways within the 
State.”213 The Court concluded that these exceptions evidenced an intent 
to favor in-state interests: 
 
 203. Id. at 528, 529. 
 204. Id. at 529-30. 
 205. Id. at 530. 
 206. 434 U.S. 429 (1978). 
 207. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). 
 208. See Biddle, supra note 108, at 175 (stating that both of the laws examined in Raymond 
and Kassel “were subjected to less deference by the Court because each law made certain exceptions 
for trucks traveling exclusively within the state, undermining both the safety argument and raising 
the specter of discrimination against interstate commerce”). 
 209. 434 U.S. at 432. 
 210. Id. at 432-33. 
 211. Id. at 434-35. 
 212. Id. at 435. 
 213. Id. at 446. 
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At least one of these exceptions discriminates on its face in favor of 
Wisconsin industries and against the industries of other States,214 and 
there are indications in the record that a number of the other exceptions, 
although neutral on their face, were enacted at the instance of, and 
primarily benefit, important Wisconsin industries. . . . Exemptions of 
this kind, however, weaken the presumption in favor of the validity of 
the general limit, because they undermine the assumption that the 
State’s own political processes will act as a check on local regulations 
that unduly burden interstate commerce.215 
The Court also found that the trucking companies “produced a 
massive array of evidence to disprove the State’s assertion that the 
regulations make some contribution to highway safety” and that “[t]he 
State, for its part, virtually defaulted in its defense of the regulations as a 
safety measure.”216 The Court further concluded that “the regulations 
impose[d] a substantial burden on the interstate movement of goods.”217 
Therefore, the Court held that the Wisconsin regulations violated the 
Commerce Clause.218 
The Supreme Court also discovered evidence of a state’s attempt to 
advance local interests at the expense of out of state interests in Kassel. 
At issue in this case was an Iowa statute that, similar to Raymond, 
prohibited the use of 65-foot doubles in the State and restricted most 
truck combinations to 55 feet in length.219 Despite this limit, the statute 
allowed “cities abutting the state line by local ordinance to adopt the 
length limitations of the adjoining State.”220 In defending the law, Iowa 
“asserted that 65-foot doubles [were] more dangerous than 55-foot 
singles and, in any event, that the law promote[d] safety and reduce[d] 
 
 214. The exception allowed the issuing of “permits to Wisconsin industries and their agent 
motor carriers to transport goods in trucks over 55 feet long from plants in Wisconsin to the state 
line”; however, the exception did not allow the issuing of permits “to industries with plants in other 
States to transport goods in trucks over 55 feet long through Wisconsin to markets in other States.” 
Id. at 446 n.24. See also Tushnet, supra note 107, at 158-59 (stating that this exemption “was 
discriminatory in the classic sense” because “[i]n-state interests . . . secured a benefit that was totally 
unavailable to out-of-state interests”). 
 215. Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1978). The Court, however, 
declined to decide the case “solely on the basis of the discrimination against interstate commerce 
embodied in” these regulatory exceptions. Id. at 447 n.24. 
 216. Id. at 444. 
 217. Id. at 445. 
 218. Id. at 447. Arguably, Raymond could also belong to the first class of cases explained 
above because the use of 65-foot doubles was allowed “on interstate highways and access roads in 
Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, and all of the States west from Minnesota to Washington through 
which Interstate highways 90 and 94 [the main interstates crossing Wisconsin between Illinois and 
Minnesota] run.” Id. at 432. Moreover, “at the time of trial only 17 States and the District of 
Colombia did not allow 65-foot doubles on their highways.” Id. at 437 n.9. 
 219. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 665 (1981). 
 220. Id. at 666. 
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road wear within the State by diverting much truck traffic to other 
States.”221 
Four justices found that “[t]he origin of the ‘border cities exemption’ 
also suggest[ed] that Iowa’s statute may not have been designed to ban 
dangerous trucks, but rather to discourage interstate truck traffic.”222 This 
segment of the Court noted that Iowa’s governor had vetoed a bill that 
would have allowed the use of 65-foot doubles in the state because the 
legislation “would benefit only a few Iowa-based companies while 
providing a great advantage for out-of-state trucking firms and 
competitors.”223 The legislature passed the “border cities exemption” and 
the Governor signed it into law after the veto.224 These justices went on 
to find that because the Iowa statute imposed a substantial burden on 
interstate commerce “without any significant countervailing safety 
interest,” the statute violated the Commerce Clause.225 Two other justices 
concurred in judgment and found that the Iowa statute was invalid 
simply because “Iowa sought to discourage interstate truck traffic on 
Iowa’s highways,”226 and “Iowa may not shunt off its fair share of the 
burden of maintaining interstate truck routes, nor may it create increased 
hazards on the highways of neighboring States in order to decrease the 
hazards on Iowa highways.”227 These justices felt that “Iowa’s attempt to 
deflect interstate traffic” should be subject to “a virtually per se rule of 
invalidity.”228 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has treated cases dealing with state 
regulation of interstate transportation in much the same manner as it has 
treated state regulation of other areas. The Court has invalidated 
regulation of interstate transportation under the Commerce Clause when 
the regulation was widely out of step with other states’ regulations and 
imposed a great burden on interstate commerce or when a state’s motive 
 
 221. Id. at 667. 
 222. Id. at 677. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 678-79. Evidence existed that Iowa’s prohibition also was out of step with the 
regulations of other states in its region of the country because no other state “in the West and 
Midwest prohibit[ed] the use of 65-foot double-trailer trucks within [their] borders.” Id. at 662. 
However, the dissent noted that “[m]ost truck limits are between 55 and 65 feet, and Iowa’s choice is 
thus well within the widely accepted range.” Id. at 694 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
The dissent also pointed out that “17 States and the District of Colombia, including all of New 
England and most of the Southeast” prohibited the use of 65-foot doubles on their highways. Id. at 
688 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 226. Id. at 681 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 227. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 228. Id. (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). 
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behind the regulation was to discriminate against interstate commerce or 
favor in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state interests. 
IV.  CASE LAW APPLYING THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE TO STATE 
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET 
Several federal and state courts have analyzed whether the 
application of state regulations to the Internet complied with the dormant 
commerce clause. The leading case on this issue is American Libraries 
Association v. Pataki.229 Several commentators have used Federal 
District Court Judge Preska’s analysis to assert that under dormant 
commerce clause principles states cannot and should not regulate the 
Internet at all.230 However, several courts have held that state regulation 
of the Internet can withstand dormant commerce clause scrutiny in 
certain situations.231 These latter cases demonstrate that it is possible for 
states to protect their citizenry on the Internet through legislation, 
especially when exercising their traditional police powers, consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence. 
Courts should view the Internet similarly to any other form of commerce 
in light of traditional dormant commerce clause principles and not 
necessarily as forbidden territory on which the states can never tread. 
A.  Cases Invalidating State Statutes under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause 
In American Libraries Association, several Internet related 
organizations filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction 
 
 229. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 230. Bassinger, supra note 20, at 890 (stating that “the Internet should be marked off as a 
national preserve subject only to uniform federal regulation”); Blake, supra note 23, at 156-57 
(stating that self-regulation is the only viable method of Internet regulation); LaMaina, supra note 
22, at 159 (stating that states can never “validly [restrict] materials on the Internet”). 
 231. Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 499-505 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that application of Texas motor vehicle code to car manufacturer operating a Web site to 
sell cars in Texas did not violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Hayne, 2002 WL 470853 
at ** 8-9 (Mar. 27, 2002) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophile’s activities on the 
Internet did not violate the dormant commerce clause); Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
453, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophiles’ activities on 
the Internet did not violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190-
92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophiles’ activities on the 
Internet did not violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d 248, 256 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that New York statute criminalizing the dissemination of indecent 
material to minors through the Internet in order to lure minors to engage in sexual activity passed 
dormant commerce clause analysis); People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1997) 
(holding that the application of New York consumer protection laws to New York business pursuant 
to Internet solicitations was proper under the dormant commerce clause). 
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concerning New York Penal Law section 235.21(3).232 The plaintiffs 
contended that this statute violated the First Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause.233 Judge Preska, sitting in the Southern District of 
New York, held that the statute violated the dormant commerce clause 
but declined to address any First Amendment issues that the statute 
posed.234 
The majority of the plaintiffs ran passive, informational Web sites.235 
However, some plaintiffs ran interactive Web sites where they sold 
products to site visitors, and the sites presumably required visitors to 
provide certain information in order to access the site or in order to 
purchase products.236  The statute at issue made it a felony to 
“intentionally use [] any computer communication system” to 
communicate to a minor material depicting “actual or simulated nudity, 
sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse . . . which is harmful to 
minors.”237 
Material had to meet three requirements to be considered “harmful to 
minors.”238 Relying on the United States Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment obscenity test, the material had to: (1) “appeal[] to the 
prurient interest in sex of minors;” (2) be “patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole” with regard to 
“suitable material for minors;” and (3) “lack[] serious literary, artistic, 
political and scientific value.”239 The statutory scheme also provided a 
defense (1) if the material “was disseminated” for “scientific, 
educational, governmental or other similar” purposes, (2) “[t]he 
defendant made a reasonable effort to ascertain the true age of the 
minor,” (3) the defendant had taken “reasonable, effective and 
 
 232. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 169, 183. 
 235. See id. at 161-62. The description of the plaintiffs’ Web sites provided in the decision do 
not necessarily allow for a definitive determination as to the interactiveness of each plaintiff’s Web 
site. However, it appears that the following plaintiffs ran passive Web sites where site operators only 
provided information to site visitors or facilitated communication between visitors through chat 
rooms and where operators did not require visitors to provide any information to the site operator in 
order to view this information or enter any chat rooms: American Libraries Association, Association 
of American Publishers, Public Access Networks Corporation, ECHO, New York City Net, Art on 
the Net, and the ACLU. 
 236. See id. at 162. The plaintiffs that ran what appeared to be interactive sites, given the 
description of the functions of the sites, were: American Booksellers Foundation for Free 
Expression, BiblioBytes, Magazine Publishers of America, Interactive Digital Software Association. 
Id. The decision did not mention whether or not Peacefire, an organization that “protect[ed] the 
rights of citizens under the age of 18 to use the Internet,” operated a Web site. Id. 
 237. Id. at 163 (alteration in original). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
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appropriate actions . . . to restrict or prevent access by minors,” (4) “[t]he 
defendant . . . restricted access . . . by requiring use of a verified credit 
card, debit account, adult access code or adult personal identification 
number,” or (5) the defendant “established a mechanism” that allowed 
the material to be “blocked or screened by software or other capabilities 
reasonably available.”240 
The court found that the New York statute violated the dormant 
commerce clause in three distinct ways: (1) the statute was a per se 
violation of the dormant commerce clause, (2 ) under Pike, the burdens 
on interstate commerce that the statute imposed outweighed its local 
benefits, (3)  the statute placed inconsistent regulations on commerce that 
demanded consistent treatment throughout the nation.241 First, in an 
extensive analysis spanning eight pages, Judge Preska presented her view 
that the statute regulated interstate commerce and conduct occurring 
outside the borders of the state of New York.242 The court concluded that 
the statute was “necessarily concerned with interstate 
communications.”243 The court interpreted the statute to apply “to any 
communication, intrastate or interstate that fits within the prohibition and 
over which New York has the capacity to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction.”244 Moreover, the court noted that the transient and 
anonymous nature of the Internet, with its insensitivity to geographic 
borders and the difficulty in closing off a Web site to particular states, 
prevented the application of the New York statute to “purely intrastate 
communications over the Internet because no such communications 
exist.”245 For example, the court explained that even an e-mail message 
that travels from one person in New York to another person in New York 
“may well pass through a number of states en route.”246 The court then 
determined that the Internet communications affected by the New York 
statute constituted commerce under the Commerce Clause.247 
Judge Preska went on to explain how the New York statute 
purportedly affected commerce occurring wholly outside of the borders 
of New York. The court talked about the chilling affect that the statute 
would have on the plaintiffs to “refrain[] from engaging in particular 
types of interstate commerce.”248 Judge Preska theorized that because 
 
 240. Id. at 163-64. 
 241. Id. at 169. 
 242. Id. at 169-77. 
 243. Id. at 172. 
 244. Id. at 169-70. 
 245. Id. at 170-71. 
 246. Id. at 171. 
 247. Id. at 172-73. 
 248. Id. at 174. 
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“no Web siteholder is able to close his site to New Yorkers,” the threat of 
being prosecuted under the New York statute would cause Web site 
operators and users who were physically located outside of New York to 
refrain from communicating or displaying material that presumably 
would be legal in the web site operator or user’s physical location.249 
This subordinated “the user’s home state’s polic[ies] . . . to New York’s 
local concerns.”250 Therefore, the court determined that through the 
statute New York “deliberately imposed its legislation on the Internet 
and, by doing so, projected its law into other states whose citizens use 
the Net.”251 The court held that this extraterritorial effect of the statute 
was “per se violative of the Commerce Clause.”252 
Second, Judge Preska held that the burdens that the statute imposed 
on interstate commerce were “excessive” when compared with its local 
benefits.253 The court applied the balancing test from Pike in making this 
determination. The court started by recognizing “that the protection of 
children against pedophilia is a quintessentially legitimate state 
objective.”254 However, while under the first ground for nullifying the 
statute the court amplified the threat to potential violators located outside 
of New York of being prosecuted under the statute, the court minimized 
the effect that the statute would have on potential violators in analyzing 
this second ground. The court noted that even if New York could 
exercise jurisdiction over parties located out of state, the prosecution of 
such parties “is beset with practical difficulties” because bringing 
violators physically to New York for prosecution was unlikely.255 The 
court found that the statute could “have no effect on communications 
originating outside of the United States.”256 The court also emphasized 
the number of other New York laws that criminalized obscenity and 
child pornography.257 “The local benefit to be derived from the 
challenged section of the statute is therefore confined to that narrow class 
of cases that does not fit within the parameters of any other law.”258 
On the other hand, the court found that the “chilling effect” that the 
statute caused would be an “extreme burden on interstate commerce.”259 
 
 249. Id. at 174-75. 
 250. Id. at 177. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 178. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 179. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
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“Individuals who wish to communicate images that might fall within the 
Act’s proscriptions must thus self-censor or risk prosecution, a Hobson’s 
choice that imposes an unreasonable restriction on interstate 
commerce.”260 However, Judge Preska did not explain why individuals 
would self-censor when the risk of prosecution in New York was so 
minimal due to the practical difficulties of being brought physically 
before the New York courts. The court further found that the defenses 
provided in the statute did not sufficiently lessen this burden because the 
cost of complying with those defenses “could drive some Internet users 
off the Internet altogether.”261 Therefore, Judge Preska held that the 
“severe burden” that the statute placed on interstate commerce was “not 
justifiable in light of the attenuated local benefits arising from it.”262 
Third, Judge Preska held that the New York statute would place 
inconsistent regulations on a type of commerce that demanded consistent 
treatment and stated that only the federal government could regulate the 
Internet.263 Using what some courts have described as effectively a 
preemption analysis,264 the court stated that “[t]he courts have long 
recognized that certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment 
and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level.”265 
Comparing the Internet to the United States railway and highway 
systems, the court stated that the Internet “requires a cohesive national 
scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their 
obligations.”266 Apparently, this need for uniformity would cause Judge 
Preska to not allow state regulation of the Internet in any form. Judge 
Preska stated that “[r]egulation by any single state can only result in 
chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting 
Internet users to conflicting obligations.”267 Because Web site operators 
cannot cut off access to their web sites from specific states, they would 
have to meet the “most stringent [state] standard.”268 Judge Preska stated 
that “[w]ithout the limitation’s [sic] imposed by the Commerce Clause, 
these inconsistent regulatory schemes could paralyze the development of 
 
 260. Id. at 180. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 181. 
 263. Id. at 181-83. 
 264. Hatch v. Sup. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 471 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“Pataki’s 
[argument] . . . is a sort of preemption argument: that simply logging on the Internet automatically 
places one beyond the reach of state criminal prosecution.”); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 
191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (describing Pataki’s analysis on this point as “essentially a preemption 
analysis”). 
 265. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 266. Id. at 182. 
 267. Id. at 181. 
 268. Id. at 183. 
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the Internet altogether.”269 Judge Preska held that this need for cohesive, 
federal regulation required striking down the New York statute as a 
violation of the dormant commerce clause.270 Several other courts have 
adopted Judge Preska’s analysis and have invalidated similar statutes on 
these same three grounds.271 
B.  Cases Holding State Statutes are Valid Under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
Despite Judge Preska’s view that only the federal government should 
regulate the Internet, several decisions from the California Court of 
Appeals have held that a statute criminalizing the activity of pedophiles 
on the Internet passed dormant commerce clause scrutiny.272 These cases 
examined California Penal Code section 288.2(b), which made it a felony 
to distribute “any harmful matter to a minor” over the Internet knowing a 
minor is receiving the matter with the intent of arousing or appealing to 
“passions or sexual desires of that person or of a minor” and with the 
purpose or intent of seducing a minor.273 In Hatch v. Superior Court, the 
 
 269. Id. at 181. 
 270. Id. at 183. 
 271. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1160-63 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that statute 
making dissemination of materials harmful to minors by computer a misdemeanor was 
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause and the First Amendment); Am. Booksellers 
Found. for Free Expression v. Dean, 202 F. Supp. 2d 300, 305-06, 319-321 (D. Vt. 2002) (holding 
that a Vermont statute criminalizing the dissemination of images “communicated, transmitted or 
stored electronically” that are harmful to minors was unconstitutional under the dormant commerce 
clause); PSINet v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611, 617 (W.D. Va. 2000) (holding that a Virginia 
statute making it a misdemeanor to display an “electronic file or message” containing an image or 
words depicting sexually explicit material “harmful to juveniles” violated the dormant commerce 
clause) (alteration in original); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 
739-40, 751-52 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that amendments to a Michigan statute that criminalized 
the use of computers or the Internet “to disseminate sexually explicit materials to minors” violated 
the dormant commerce clause), aff’d, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000); State v. Barrows, 677 N.Y.S.2d 
672, 679-80, 684-86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (stating that section 235.22 of the New York Penal Code, 
which made it a crime to disseminate harmful material over the Internet to a minor in order to induce 
a minor to engage in sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the disseminator, violated the dormant 
commerce clause to the extent that the statute applied to interstate transmissions). 
 272. Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Hsu, 99 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  See also People v. Hayne, 2002 WL 470853 at ** 8-9 
(Mar. 27, 2002) (holding that the same statutory section as analyzed in Hatch and Hsu, section 
288.2(b), did not violate the Commerce Clause). Hayne is an unpublished decision, and pursuant to 
California Rule of Court 977, courts and parties cannot cite or rely on unpublished opinions, except 
in limited circumstances. 
 273. See Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1at 189 n.3. Hatch also 
examined the constitutionality of section 288.2(a), which did not expressly regulate Internet 
communications. 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463. The California legislature added subdivision (b) to 
expressly apply the prohibitions of the statute to the Internet. Id. at 464. The defendant in Hatch had 
committed alleged offenses both before and after the enactment of subdivision (b), and therefore, 
only subdivision (a) applied to a large part of his conduct and subdivision (b) applied to his 
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defendant, a California resident, initially communicated with a woman 
representing herself as being two different thirteen year-old girls in a 
private Internet chat room, and the defendant discussed engaging in 
specific sexual conduct with her in several subsequent Internet 
communications.274 The defendant also met with the woman in person 
twice.275 In People v. Hsu, the defendant initiated several “instant 
messages” over the Internet from his residence in Walnut Creek, 
California in which he “offered to engage in specific sexual acts” with a 
police officer pretending to be a 14 year-old boy.276 Through these 
Internet communications, the defendant also “invited the boy to meet 
him at his house.”277 
These cases found that Judge Preska’s analysis in American 
Libraries Association did not apply to the California statute.278 
Countering the American Libraries Association finding that the New 
York statute regulated extraterritorially and was, therefore, a per se 
violation of the dormant commerce clause, the court in Hatch stated that, 
“[t]he assumption that extraterritorial enforcement of state criminal 
statutes is normative is incorrect.”279 The court explained that in order to 
be subject to prosecution under California’s criminal jurisdiction statutes 
a person must have committed at least part of the crime within the 
state.280 The court found that “there [was] no reason to suppose 
California would attempt to impose its policies on other states” in light of 
these jurisdictional statutes, “which generally bar punishment for wholly 
extraterritorial offenses.”281 
In weighing the burden on interstate commerce in relation to the 
local benefits from the statute, the Hatch court further commented that 
the requirements for criminal jurisdiction, along with the statute’s intent 
element, minimized the statute’s burden on interstate commerce. 
“[G]iven the requirement that those charged must intend to seduce and 
 
remaining activities. Id. at 460-62, 464. However, the court interpreted subdivision (a) to also apply 
to communications occurring over the Internet. Id. at 478-79. 
 274. Id. at 460-61, 470. 
 275. Id. at 461-62. 
 276. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188-89. 
 277. Id. at 189. 
 278. Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-192. See also Hayne, 2002 
WL 470853 at *8-9 (distinguishing the statute at issue in Am . Libraries Ass’n from section 
288.2(b)). 
 279. Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. 
 280. Id. at 472. See also Hayne, 2002 WL 470853 at *9 (“[S]ection 288.2, in the context of the 
Penal Code as a whole, only penalizes acts that occur within the state.”). 
 281. Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. Accord Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192 (“Section 288.2 
subdivision (b) makes no reference to place of performance, so courts must assume the Legislature 
did not intend to regulate conduct taking place outside of the state.”). 
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the additional requirement that they must commit at least an attempt [in 
California], no rational analysis supports the proposition section 288.2 
imposes any burden on interstate commerce.”282 The court found that 
“[w]hile a ban on the simple communication of certain materials may 
interfere with an adult’s legitimate rights, a ban on communication of 
specified matter to a minor for the purposes of seduction can only affect 
the rights of a very narrow class of adults who intend to engage in sex 
with minors.”283 
In comparing the local benefits of the statute with the burden placed 
on interstate commerce, the Hsu court started by recognizing that state 
“[s]tatutes affecting public safety carry a strong presumption of 
validity.”284 “Absent conflicting federal legislation, states retain their 
authority under their general police powers to regulate matters of 
legitimate local concern, even if interstate commerce may be 
affected.”285 Furthermore, the court found that “[s]tates have a 
compelling interest in protecting minors from harm generally and 
certainly from being seduced to engage in sexual activity.”286 On the 
other hand, the Hsu court found it difficult to discern how criminalizing 
“the transmission of harmful sexual material to known minors in order to 
seduce them” would burden “any legitimate commerce.”287 The court 
found that the California statute was distinguishable from the New York 
statute at issue in American Libraries Association due to its additional 
intent requirements.288 “Only when material is disseminated to a known 
minor with the intent to arouse the prurient interest of the sender and/or 
minor and with the intent to seduce the minor does the dissemination 
become a criminal act.”289 Therefore, the courts in Hatch and Hsu held 
that the California statute did not unduly burden interstate commerce.290 
Neither court agreed with Judge Preska’s view that the states should 
not regulate the Internet for fear that Internet users would be subject to 
inconsistent regulations that would paralyze Internet development. The 
Hatch court stated, “[w]hile it may be true that Internet communications 
routinely pass along interstate lines, we do not believe this general 
 
 282. Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473. See also Hayne, 2002 WL 470853 at *8 (“[T]he intent to 
seduce requirement greatly narrows the scope of the law and its effect on interstate commerce.”). 
 283. Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472. 
 284. People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 191. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 190-92. 
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proposition can be employed . . . to insulate pedophiles from prosecution 
simply by reason of their usage of modern technology.”291 Finding that 
the California statute had little or no impact on interstate commerce, both 
courts held that the regulation at issue would not subject Internet users to 
onerous and inconsistent regulation.292 
Two New York state courts similarly have held that New York 
statutes applied to conduct occurring on the Internet were valid under 
dormant commerce clause principles. In People v. Foley, the Appellate 
Division of the New York Supreme Court held that a different section of 
New York’s penal law than the section analyzed in American Libraries 
Association passed muster under the Commerce Clause.293 The case dealt 
with New York Penal Law section 235.22 which criminalized 
“disseminating indecent material to minors” over the Internet and 
through such dissemination inviting or inducing a minor to engage in 
sexual activity.294 The court found that this second “luring” element of 
the statute narrowed the scope of the statute, lessened any burden on 
interstate commerce, and distinguished the statute from the provision at 
issue in American Libraries Association.295 “The purpose of Penal Law § 
235.22 was not to regulate commerce, but to protect the children of this 
State who use the Internet. The statute is not an economic protectionist 
measure, but rather is directed at a legitimate local concern.”296 
Similarly, in People v. Lipsitz, a New York trial court held that the 
application of New York consumer protection laws to a New York 
business that engaged in consumer fraud through e-mail solicitations was 
proper under the dormant commerce clause.297 The court found that the 
consumer protection laws at issue “were not designed nor aimed at 
 
 291. Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471. 
 292. See Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-91; Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72. 
 293. 692 N.Y.S.2d 248, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), aff’d, 731 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000). 
 294. Id. at 251. 
 295. Id. at 256. 
 296. Id. 
 297. 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1997). Although Lipsitz dealt strictly with e-mail 
solicitations, its analysis is also important to state regulation of other types of Internet activity due to 
its emphasis on the states’ interests in enforcing consumer protection legislation over the Internet. 
See infra notes 332-336 and accompanying text. Two other decisions also have dealt with the 
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause of state regulation of e-mail. In Ferguson v. 
Friendfinders, Inc., the California Court of Appeals held that a California statute that regulated 
“conduct by persons or entities doing business in California who transmit unsolicited advertising 
materials” through electronic mail and fax machines was valid under the Commerce Clause. 115 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 258, 260, 264-69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). In State v. Heckel, the Washington Supreme Court 
upheld a Washington statute that prohibited “sending a commercial e-mail message from a computer 
located in Washington or to an e-mail address held by a Washington resident” that misrepresented or 
disguised “the message’s point of origin or transmission path, or [used] a misleading subject line” 
after analyzing it under dormant commerce clause principles. 24 P.3d 404, 407, 409-13 (Wash. 
2001). 
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regulating conduct outside [New York’s] borders, not even indirectly.”298 
“The claims are of local concern, as recognized by the nationwide system 
of state consumer protection laws. There is no compelling reason to find 
that local legal officials must take a ‘hands off’ approach just because a 
crook or con artist is technologically sophisticated enough to sell on the 
Internet.”299 Thus, the court concluded that the application of the New 
York consumer protection provisions to the defendant was 
constitutional.300 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also has 
held that the application of Texas’s motor vehicle code to a car 
manufacturer’s operation of a Web site used to sell cars within the state 
did not violate the dormant commerce clause.301 In Ford Motor Co. v. 
Texas Department of Transportation, Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) set 
up a Web site through which consumers could view used vehicles for 
sale or lease at a “no-haggle price.”302 Consumers in the Houston 
metropolitan area could place a “hold” on a particular vehicle and then 
view the vehicle in person at a specified local dealership.303 If the 
consumer chose to purchase the vehicle after viewing it in person and 
going on a test drive, then Ford would transfer title to the car to the 
dealership that then would transfer title to the consumer.304 The 
agreement between local dealerships in Houston and Ford prohibited the 
dealerships from “attempting to interest the customer in any of the 
dealer’s inventory until after the customer [had] declined to purchase the 
Ford Internet vehicle.”305 The Texas government filed an administrative 
complaint with the Texas Motor Vehicle Board alleging that Ford had 
violated Texas law prohibiting anyone from serving as a car dealer 
without a license and prohibiting car manufacturers from acting in the 
capacity of a car dealership.306 Ford then filed a declaratory judgment 
action and sought injunctive relief in the federal district court alleging, 
among other things, that applying Texas law to Ford’s Web site activities 
violated the Commerce Clause.307 
 
 298. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 475 (citations omitted). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 475. 
 301. Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 302. Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 905, 907 (W.D. Tex. 2000), 
aff’d, 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Ford Motor, 264 F.3d at 499. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Ford Motor, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 908. 
 307. Id. 
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In analyzing the dormant commerce clause issue, the Fifth Circuit 
started by finding that the application of Texas motor vehicle law to 
Ford’s initiation of car sales through its Web site did not discriminate 
against “out-of-state interests.”308 The court found that the purpose of the 
Texas statute was “to prevent manufacturers from utilizing their superior 
market position to compete against retailers in the retail car market” and 
to prevent the “vertical integration of the automobile market.”309 The 
court found that the applicable Texas law treated out-of-state car 
manufacturers in the same manner as in-state manufacturers.310 Similarly, 
“[o]ut-of-state corporations, which are non-manufacturers, have the same 
opportunity as in-state corporations to obtain a license and operate a 
dealership in Texas.”311 Thus, the court held that the Texas law did not 
discriminate “either facially or in practical effect” against interstate 
commerce and was not a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.312 
The Fifth Circuit then went on to analyze the burden placed on 
interstate commerce compared to the “putative local benefits.”313 First, 
the court found that the statute’s purpose of preventing “vertically 
integrated companies from taking advantage of their incongruous market 
position” was a legitimate state interest.314 Second, the court found that 
evidence existed “from which a reasonable legislator could believe that 
[the Texas statute] would further the State’s legitimate interest in 
preventing manufacturers from utilizing their superior market position to 
compete against dealers.”315 With regard to the cars, largely “preowned 
vehicles that were originally leased by a Ford dealer to a consumer” and 
“to which Ford never relinquished title,” sold through Ford’s Web site, 
the court found that “Ford seems to remain in a superior market position 
to [sell versus] its dealers.”316 Moreover, the court found that the price 
that Ford set for the cars posted on its Web site would “certainly affect 
the price of preowned vehicles sold by independent dealers.”317 
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit found that the statute did not burden 
interstate commerce because “[t]he number of out-of-state vehicles 
retailed in Texas [would] not decrease” due to the Texas statute.318 Thus, 
 
 308. Ford Motor, 264 F.3d at 499. 
 309. Id. at 500. 
 310. Id. at 502. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 503. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 504. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 503 n.3. 
 318. Id. at 503. 
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the court held that the burden on interstate commerce, if any, was not 
“clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”319 
The Fifth Circuit dealt with Ford’s assertion that “the need for 
nationwide uniformity [in regulating the Internet outweighed] the State’s 
interests in regulating.”320 The court stated that applying that principle to 
the case “would lead to absurd results” and “would allow corporations or 
individuals to circumvent otherwise constitutional state laws and 
regulations simply by connecting the transaction to the Internet.”321 The 
court noted that the Texas statute prohibited “all forms of marketing and 
sales by manufacturers, not just those conducted via the Internet.”322 The 
court held that the statute’s “incidental regulation of Internet activities” 
did not violate the dormant commerce clause.323 Therefore, despite the 
broad assertions that American Libraries Association and several 
commentators have made regarding the inability of states to regulate 
Internet activity under the Commerce Clause, courts have found such 
regulation to be valid in several situations. 
V.  PROPOSED DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF STATE 
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET 
Courts dealing with state regulation of the Internet should examine 
such regulation on a case-by-case basis considering the proper factors.  
As explained above in section III. B., the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
the validity of state regulations under the dormant commerce clause, at 
base, constitutes a balancing test in which the Court weighs the 
regulation’s local benefits to the state against the burden that the state 
regulation places on interstate commerce.324 The larger the benefit to the 
state from the regulation, or the more important the state interest the 
regulation furthers, the more permissive the Court will be in allowing the 
regulation to stand despite any burden to interstate commerce. Thus, any 
analysis of a state statute that regulates the Internet should begin by 
 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 504. 
 321. Id. at 505. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (setting out the modern balancing test that governs dormant commerce clause 
jurisprudence). The application of this balancing test assumes that the state did not enact the statute 
with the purpose of discriminating against interstate commerce. See also Lawrence, supra note 18, at 
416 (presenting a framework for understanding the Supreme Court’s analysis of dormant commerce 
clause cases which always applies the balancing test of Pike except when the state enacted the 
regulation with the purpose of discriminating against interstate commerce). 
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analyzing the state interest that the regulation furthers and the putative 
local benefits that the regulation provides. 
In examining the benefits of state Internet regulations, courts should 
be deferential to a state’s judgment concerning the benefits derived from 
a regulation when the legislation deals with an area concerning states’ 
police powers, such as protection of children from pedophiles, 
consumers’ protection against unfair business practices, and regulation of 
gambling activities.  Additionally, when analyzing the burdens of state 
Internet regulation on interstate commerce, courts should weigh the 
factors that decrease the anonymity of Internet communications.  These 
factors are the interactivity of the Web site, the type of goods sold on the 
site (whether tangible or electronic), and the availability of technology to 
verify the geographic location of site users.  Courts also should recognize 
that state Internet regulations do not necessarily have an extraterritorial 
effect.  Once a court has examined these factors and weighed these 
considerations, the court can properly conclude whether the benefits of 
the regulation at issue outweigh the burdens that the regulation puts on 
interstate commerce. 
A.  Important Considerations in Analyzing the Benefits of State Internet 
Regulation 
As long as a state does not enact legislation for the purpose of 
discriminating against interstate commerce, in the absence of 
congressional legislation on the topic concerned, the state has latitude to 
exercise its police powers under the Commerce Clause, even if such 
regulation affects interstate commerce.325 The Court has recognized this 
rule throughout its history of applying the dormant commerce clause.326 
In several cases concerning the validity of state regulation of Internet 
activity under the Commerce Clause, courts have dealt with two topics 
that fit firmly within the states’ traditional police powers: protection of 
children from pedophiles327 and consumer protection against unfair 
 
 325. See supra notes 140, 168-179, 182-92 and accompanying text. 
 326. Supra notes 112-140 and accompanying text. 
 327. See People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at ** 8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 
2002) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophile’s activities on the Internet did not 
violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophiles’ activities on the Internet did not 
violate the dormant commerce clause); Hatch v. Super. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2000) (holding that California statute criminalizing pedophiles’ activities on the Internet did not 
violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d 248, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999), aff’d, 731 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that New York statute criminalizing the 
dissemination of indecent material to minors through the Internet in order to lure minors to engage in 
sexual activity passed dormant commerce clause analysis). 
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business practices.328 Courts traditionally have recognized the states’ 
strong interests in protecting the welfare of their children329 and in 
protecting their citizens from deceptive and fraudulent business 
practices.330 Moreover, when a state regulation concerns the safety of its 
citizens, the Supreme Court is generally deferential to a state 
legislature’s judgment regarding the putative benefits of its regulation, 
even in areas that might have a significant impact on interstate commerce 
such as transportation and corporate regulation.331 
A state’s interest in protecting the well being of its children and its 
citizens from fraudulent and manipulative business transactions exists 
whenever an Internet communication is received within the state’s 
geographical boundaries. The mere fact that a communication occurs in 
cyberspace does not make these state interests vanish.332 Internet activity 
 
 328. See Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 499-505 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that application of section of Texas motor vehicle code prohibiting car manufacturers from 
acting as dealers in Texas to car manufacturer operating a Web site to sell cars in Texas did not 
violate the dormant commerce clause); People v. Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sup. Ct. 1997) 
(holding that the application of New York consumer protection laws to New York business due to 
Internet solicitations was proper under the dormant commerce clause). 
 329. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (“It is evident beyond the 
need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’”) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 607 
(1982))); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“The well-being of its children is of 
course a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate. . . .”); Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
190 (“States have a compelling interest in protecting minors from harm generally and certainly from 
being seduced to engage in sexual activities.”); People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d 248, 256 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1999) (holding that “any incidental effects” of a New York statute that prohibited the “luring” 
of minors into engaging in sexual activity was “not unduly burdensome in relation to the compelling 
interest of the State in protecting children”). 
 330. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (recognizing a 
state’s “strong” interest “in protecting consumers and regulating commercial transactions”); Head v. 
N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs of Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 445 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Such 
legislation, whether concerned with the health and safety of consumers, or with their protection 
against fraud and deception, embodies a traditional state interest of the sort which our decisions have 
consistently respected.”); Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 475 (stating that “local consumer fraud laws touch 
upon no known federal policy which requires uniformity” and that the consumer complaints in the 
case were “of local concern, as recognized by the nationwide system of state consumer protection 
laws”). 
 331. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“We think the Court of 
Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state 
regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a 
product of state law.”); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) 
(“[R]egulations that touch upon safety . . . are those that ‘the Court has been most reluctant to 
invalidate.’” (quoting Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978))); Raymond 
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978) (“[T]he Court has been most reluctant to 
invalidate under the Commerce Clause ‘state legislation in the field of safety where the propriety of 
local regulation has long been recognized.’” (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 
(1970)). 
 332. See Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471 (stating that pedophiles should not be insulated from 
prosecution by the State of California “simply by reason of their usage of modern technology”); 
Lipsitz, 663 N.Y.S. 2d at 475 (“There is no compelling reason to find that local legal officials must 
LOUDENSLAGER - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:05 PM 
240 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
“produce[s] harmful, real-world effects” for the citizens of states,333 
among them subjecting children to the influence of pedophiles and 
subjecting consumers to scam artists.334 One could argue that federal 
regulation may not be proper in such areas or may not even be effective 
in dealing with these deleterious effects of Internet activity.335 Even if 
federal regulation would be proper and effective if enacted, in its 
absence, state regulation in these areas prevents a “legal vacuum” from 
occurring and prevents these interests from going unprotected.336 
Another area that concerns the states’ exercise of their traditional 
police powers is gambling.337 This subject has great significance for 
Internet regulation because of the high number of gambling Web sites 
available to Internet users.338 When a state citizen visits a gambling Web 
site, the site has the potential to produce deleterious effects in that state 
such as increasing “family strife,” decreasing “in-state gambling 
revenues” if the state allows gambling,339 increasing “addictive or 
compulsive behavior,” and even increasing “parental failure to support or 
adequately care for children.”340 Therefore, the states’ strong interests in 
 
take a ‘hands off’ approach just because a crook or con artist is technologically sophisticated enough 
to sell on the Internet.”). 
 333. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1216 (1998). 
 334. See id. at 1242 (“Cyberspace users solicit and deliver kiddie porn, launder money, 
sexually harass, defraud, and so on. It is these and many other real-space costs – costs that 
cyberspace communities cannot effectively internalize – that national regulatory regimes worry 
about and aim to regulate.”). 
 335. See Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet?: Monitoring and Supporting a 
New Frontier, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 476-77 (1998) (noting Congress’s inability to regulate 
the subjection of minors to indecent materials on the Internet under the Communications Decency 
Act). 
 336. See id. at 476 (“As expansive federal legislative or regulatory effects are precluded on 
constitutional grounds, erosion of state authority could create a legal vacuum.”). 
State authority confers flexibility on the nation’s laws and regulations, so that the 
Internet’s inevitable local effects can be monitored by representatives of the local 
communities affected. When the law’s emphasis on regional or local community 
standards hinders legislative monitoring, state laws may be needed to fill the breach. 
Id. at 477. 
 337. See, e.g., Pasados de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) 
(recognizing that Puerto Rico’s regulation of gambling concerned its “interest in the health, safety, 
and welfare of its citizens” and constituted a “‘substantial’ government interest”); Casino Ventures 
v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that gambling restrictions “represent a well-
recognized exercise of state police power” because they “are aimed at promoting the welfare, safety, 
and morals” of a state’s citizens). 
 338. However, as of the summer of 2002, a court decision had yet to determine the validity of 
state regulation of gambling sites under the Commerce Clause. 
 339. Goldsmith, supra note 332, at 1216 (“Internet gambling can decrease in-state gambling 
revenues and cause family strife.”). 
 340. Salbu, supra note 334, at 445 (“Because gambling can become an addictive or 
compulsive behavior, it may contribute to parental failure to support or adequately care for children 
if parents lose their money or divert their time from child-rearing in order to gamble.”). 
It is irrelevant to the state that seeks to discourage the sloth, waste, sinfulness, or evil of 
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regulating gambling activity still exist when a citizen gambles over the 
Internet as opposed to in a physical structure located in the state.341 
When a state statute regulating Internet activity involves the exercise 
of a state’s traditional police powers – such as protecting the welfare of 
children, protecting state consumers from unfair business practices, and 
controlling the deleterious effects of gambling – a court should recognize 
the strong state interests involved and give some deference to the state 
legislature’s judgments regarding the local benefits of the statute. In this 
manner, the delicate balancing of state and national interests involved in 
the federal system will stay intact. American Libraries Association and 
its progeny failed to give proper deference to such states’ interests in 
exercising their state police powers. One commentator has recognized 
that Judge Preska in American Libraries Association, 
underestimated what weight should be placed on the state benefit side 
of the scales, particularly when a safety law is involved. Nearly every 
[dormant commerce clause] opinion has stressed the special deference 
that should be accorded to a state acting in a non-discriminatory way to 
improve the health and safety of its citizens.342 
While the statute involved in American Libraries Association may have 
failed under dormant commerce clause analysis for other reasons,343 
Judge Preska erred in not giving New York’s strong interest in protecting 
the well-being of its children enough significance when weighing the 
putative local benefits side of the Pike balancing test.344 Much of the 
progeny of American Libraries Association have made this same 
mistake.345 
 
gambling whether such activities are facilitated by live croupiers or computer 
programs. . . . Opportunities to squander child support resources are as extensive in 
cybercasinos as in real ones. Thus, while computerized gambling may confer some 
marginal potential advantages over real-space gambling with regard to the parental 
neglect rationale [in that parents have a greater ability to supervise children from a home 
computer than in a brick and mortar casino], a state’s basic interest in protecting its 
underage citizens remains strong. 
Id. at 446-47. However, Salbu does note that Internet gambling does decrease a state’s interest in 
regulating gambling due to organized crimes entanglement with this activity because “organized 
crime tends to be linked to a geographic proximity among participants that enables efficient physical 
retribution.” Id. at 447. 
 341. Id. at 448 (concluding that “computerization of gambling does not destroy the legitimacy 
of traditional state police power”). 
 342. Biddle, supra note 108, at 177. 
 343. See infra section VI. C. 
 344. See supra notes 253-257 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Preska’s analysis in 
Pataki of the local benefits of a New York statute criminalizing the dissemination of harmful 
material to minors by computer). 
 345. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 1999) (minimizing the local 
benefits of a statute making dissemination of harmful material to minors by computer a 
misdemeanor); PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 167 F. Supp. 2d 878, 882, 891 (W.D. Va. 2001) (failing to 
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B.  Important Considerations in Analyzing the Burdens of State Internet 
Regulation on Interstate Commerce 
As explained in section II. B., two particular characteristics of the 
operation of the Internet and the Web, transience and anonymity, 
increase the chances that state regulation of Internet activity will burden 
interstate commerce significantly. Transience refers to the almost infinite 
number of paths, through numerous states, that data can travel when two 
computers on the Internet communicate with one another.346 Transience 
gives the Internet its interstate, or even international, character.347 
Anonymity refers to the inability of Internet or Web users to determine 
the physical location of the computers used to transport data from one 
computer to another.348 When a browser user accesses a Web site, the 
user has no knowledge of the geographic location of the server whose 
computer files the browser is accessing. Similarly, people and entities 
that operate a Web site have difficulty determining the geographic 
location of people who access the Web site. 
Transience and anonymity give rise to concerns that the states’ 
regulation of Internet activity will greatly burden a person or entity’s 
operation of a Web site because the operator, not being able to determine 
the geographic location of a particular user of the site or the states 
through which the computer data traveled, will have to comply with the 
standards of the state with the most stringent requirements.349 Moreover, 
the Web site operator would have to comply with the regulations of that 
state regardless of whether a particular person accessing the site actually 
is located in that state.350 Transience and anonymity also increase the 
chances that a Web site operator will be subject to inconsistent Internet 
regulations from several different states.351 This “chilling effect” on 
Internet activity is what Judge Preska in American Libraries Association 
noted as the major burden placed on Web site operators by state Internet 
regulations.352 
 
even examine the local benefits of a Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor to display an 
“electronic file or message containing an image” or words depicting sexually explicit material 
“harmful to juveniles”); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 739-40, 
(E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d, 238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (minimizing the local benefits of amendments 
to a Michigan statute that criminalized the use of computers or the Internet “to disseminate sexually 
explicit materials to minors”). 
 346. Supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 347. Supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 348. Supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
 349. See supra notes 247-57, 266-68 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 266-268 and accompanying text. 
 352. See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See also 
supra notes 258-59 and accompanying text. 
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However, the cases addressing state Internet regulation under the 
Commerce Clause have failed to recognize and account for, at least 
explicitly, several different factors that affect the anonymous nature of 
Web commerce. These factors include (1) the interactivity of a Web site, 
(2) the type of goods sold on the site (whether tangible or electronic), and 
(3) the availability of technology to verify the geographic location of site 
users.353 
1.  The importance of the interactivity of a Web site to the burden of state 
regulation 
The more interactive a Web site, the more opportunity the operator 
of the Web site will have to obtain accurate information on the 
geographic location of a particular user of the site. An “interactive” Web 
site allows a site user to exchange information with the site’s computer 
server.354 Thus, the operator of an interactive Web site has more ability 
than the operator of a “passive” site, which simply makes information 
available to a site user, to obtain accurate information on the geographic 
location of a particular user and comply with the specific regulations of 
the user’s state or prevent access to particular users located in states that 
prohibit activities facilitated by the Web site. Consequently, the operator 
of an interactive Web site bears less of a burden in complying with the 
regulations of different states. 
Courts examining the validity of state Internet regulations under the 
Commerce Clause to determine the burden placed on Web sites by the 
regulations concerned should consider whether or not the sites affected 
are more interactive or passive. Many courts already consider the 
interactivity of a Web site under the Due Process Clause when 
examining whether a court may properly assert personal jurisdiction over 
the person or entity operating a Web site.355 While the policy 
 
 353. Another consideration with the transient nature of Internet communications that decreases 
the burden of state Internet regulations on interstate commerce is the lack of desire of states to 
regulate commercial transactions whose only contact with the state is the physical transportation of 
computer data through the state. The limits that criminal jurisdiction places on the practical ability of 
the states to apply their regulations to Internet activity also decrease the burden of state Internet 
regulations on interstate commerce. This article examines these concepts when discussing the 
potential extraterritorial effect of state Internet regulations. See infra section V. C. These two 
considerations will not change from case to case, and therefore, a court would not have to separately 
analyze them in each case like the three factors noted here. 
 354. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. PA. 1997). 
 355. See id. (holding “that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally 
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 
conducts over the Internet” such as “the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange 
of information that occurs on the Web site”). See also, e.g., Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered 
Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Zippo analysis to determine whether a 
defendant’s contacts with Utah through its Web site were sufficient for a court’s exercise of personal 
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considerations under the Commerce Clause are different from Due 
Process considerations,356 courts’ consideration of the interactivity of 
Web sites under another branch of constitutional analysis in deciding 
whether a person or entity running a Web site has sufficient notice of the 
site’s operation in a particular geographic location lends credibility to 
this distinction.357 Recognizing the significance of the interactivity of 
Web sites in determining the burden placed on interstate commerce by 
state Internet regulations will help prevent courts from overstating the 
need for uniform regulation and failing sufficiently to respect the states’ 
legitimate exercise of their police powers. 
 
jurisdiction); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (adopting Zippo analysis 
to determine whether a defendant’s contacts with Texas through its Web site were sufficient for a 
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (stating that “the common thread [in cases examining the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
due to the operation of a Web site], well stated by the district court in Zippo, is that ‘the likelihood 
that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and 
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet’” (quoting Zippo, 952 F. 
Supp. at 1124)); Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 613 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(stating that in wrestling “with applying the principles of personal jurisdiction to a defendant’s 
conduct with the forum state through a Web site . . . many courts have applied the ‘sliding scale’ test 
set forth in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.”, which distinguishes between passive and 
interactive Web sites); Rainy Day Books, Inc. v. Rainy Day Books & Cafe, L.L.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d 
1158, 1163 (D. Kan. 2002) (“One way a plaintiff can establish that a defendant has the requisite 
minimum contacts with the forum state is to use the Internet website sliding scale analysis set forth 
in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.”); Yvonne Beshany & Sean Shirley, Cyber-Jurisdiction: 
When Does Use of the Internet Establish Personal Jurisdiction?, 63 ALA. LAW. 36, 38 (2002) (“The 
‘sliding scale’ adopted by the Zippo court has been adopted by a majority of the circuits facing the 
same determinations of personal jurisdiction.”). 
 356. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (holding that “the nexus 
requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical” for the purpose of 
examining state taxation of commercial activity because the “two standards are animated by 
different constitutional concerns and policies”). 
Due process centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity. . . . 
We have, therefore, often identified “notice” or “fair warning” as the analytic touchstone 
of due process nexus analysis. In contrast, the Commerce Clause and its nexus 
requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fairness for the individual 
defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the national 
economy. 
Id. 
 357. See, e.g., Soma Med. Int’l, 196 F.3d at 1299 (“[W]e cannot conclude that SCB’s 
maintenance of a passive website, merely providing information to interested viewers, constitutes the 
kind of purposeful availment of the benefits of doing business in Utah, such that SCB could expect 
to be haled into court in that state.”); Rainy Day Books, L.L.C., 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 
(“Defendant’s alleged intentional infringement of Plaintiff’s service mark on its website, from which 
Kansas residents can purchase books, combined with its knowledge that Plaintiff’s main retail 
bookstore is located in Kansas, puts Defendant on notice that it should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into this court.”). 
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2.  The importance of the type of Internet commerce involved to the 
burden of state regulation 
In determining the burden that a particular state’s Internet regulation 
places on interstate commerce, courts should also examine the type of 
Internet or Web commerce that the regulation affects. As explained in 
section II. B. 2., Web sites that simply receive orders from customers for 
tangible goods over the Internet have less difficulty in determining the 
physical location of a particular site user than Web sites that sell 
electronic goods or provide services or information on the Internet for a 
fee.358 When the sale of a tangible good is involved, for example a 
paperback book, the seller must ship the product to the customer at a 
particular postal address. Thus, in order to complete the transaction, the 
seller must obtain accurate information about the geographic location of 
the customer, and the buyer has an incentive to provide accurate shipping 
information in order to actually receive the product purchased.359 In such 
situations, the seller, similar to mail order businesses, can more easily 
comply with different regulations from various states. However, Web 
sites on which users may download software or receive information or 
services, such as legal advice or other professional services, do not have 
the same opportunity to verify the location of the site user, and users do 
not have the same incentive to provide accurate information about their 
geographic location, even if such information is sought. Again, courts 
can avoid overstating the burden placed on interstate commerce by a 
state’s regulation if they consider whether the regulation affects 
transactions involving tangible versus electronic goods sold over the 
Internet.  This consideration is important because the buyer of tangible 
goods cannot remain anonymous as easily as the purchaser of electronic 
goods. 
3.  The significance of Internet identification technology to the burden of 
state regulation 
Courts should also begin to recognize that methods do exist for the 
operators of Web sites to determine the geographic location of a site user 
and decrease the anonymity present in Internet communications. This is 
especially important when a Web site is passive or when a Web site sells 
electronic goods or services. As explained above in section II. B. 2., Web 
 
 358. See Geist, supra note 35, at 559 (“The sale of tangible products has minimal legal impact 
on the traditional buyer-seller dynamic.”). 
 359. See id. (“Notwithstanding the online character of the transaction, the sale of such 
[tangible] products requires physical transportation from the seller to the buyer, maintaining . . . easy 
identification of both buyer and seller.”). 
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operators presently can obtain information about a user’s residence 
through credit card verification technology or by requiring the use of 
personal identification numbers in order to access the site.360 Moreover, 
developing technology exists using algorithms to determine instantly the 
geographic location of a user’s computer.361 This technology would 
allow Web hosts to get such information without the time and privacy 
costs involved with PINs, but presently is more expensive than credit 
card verification and PIN systems. However, there is reason to believe 
that the cost of this emerging technology will decrease significantly in 
the future.362 
The availability of these different technologies further decreases the 
burden of complying with a particular state’s regulatory regime. While 
the use of such technology does cause the operators of Web sites to incur 
monetary costs, as well as sometimes requiring site users to incur time 
and privacy costs, these costs are not unlike those commonly incurred by 
other brick and mortar businesses in order to comply with the regulations 
of different states.363 Courts in a couple of contexts have already found it 
reasonable for Web site operators to screen out residents from specific 
jurisdictions in order to avoid violating the law in those jurisdictions.364 
Thus, in analyzing state regulations that affect Internet activity under the 
Commerce Clause, courts should recognize that technology does exist 
that can decrease the burden on Web site operators of complying with 
different state’s regulatory regimes and that it is not unreasonable to 
expect Web site operators to incur some monetary costs in implementing 
such technology. If courts begin to consider the three factors discussed 
 
 360. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text. 
 361. Supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. 
 362. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 92, at 812 (stating that “there is good reason to 
believe that geographical filtering technology will be precise and inexpensive in the near future”). 
 363. See id. at 823 (“As we have emphasized, it is common for firms doing business in the 
United States to incur costs learning about and complying with fifty state regulations.”); Goldsmith, 
supra note 332, at 1230 (“It is relatively uncontroversial that a newspaper publisher is liable for 
harms caused wherever the newspaper is published or distributed.”); Redish & Nugent, supra note 
109, at 598-99 (stating that under the federalist system set up under the Constitution “those involved 
in interstate commerce are put on notice that they may be subjected to different regulations in 
different states” and that “[t]his is simply the cost of our having chosen a federal system of 
government”). 
 364. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating in a case 
involving a pornographic Web site that “[i]f Defendants did not wish to subject themselves to 
liability in jurisdictions with less tolerant standards for determining obscenity, they could have 
refused to give passwords to members in those districts, thus precluding the risk of liability”); 
Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating 
in a contempt action to enforce a prior judgment, “[w]hile this Court has neither the jurisdiction nor 
the desire to prohibit the creation of Internet sites around the globe, it may prohibit access to those 
sites in this country. Therefore, while [the defendant] may continue to operate its Internet site, [the 
defendant] must refrain from accepting subscriptions from customers living in the United 
States.”)(emphasis in original). 
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above in each case, they can better evaluate the true burden of a 
particular state Internet regulation on interstate commerce. 
C.  State Internet Regulations Do Not Necessarily Have an 
Extraterritorial Effect 
In analyzing state Internet regulations under the Commerce Clause, 
courts generally have failed, at least explicitly, to recognize the factors 
just explained which lessen the burden on Internet activities. Several 
courts have overstated the desire of states to regulate transient Internet 
communications and the ability of courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over Internet activities. In this manner, some courts, such as the district 
court in American Libraries Association, have overstated the burden to 
interstate commerce of state Internet regulation and asserted that 
applying state statutes to Internet activity constitutes extraterritorial 
regulation. 
One manner in which the potential reach of state Internet regulations 
has been overblown deals with the transient nature of Internet and Web 
operations. Due to the packet-switching technology and distributed 
network that the Internet uses in transporting computer data, the data sent 
between two computers can travel through numerous states regardless of 
the physical location of the originating and receiving computers. In 
theory, a state could attempt to regulate all Internet communications 
whose data transiently passes through the state. Some cases dealing with 
state regulation of Internet activity under the dormant commerce clause 
have used this theoretical possibility to overstate the potential reach of 
state Internet regulations.365 However, transient data that passes through 
a state en route to its end recipient in another state does not cause any 
practical effect in the first state. Therefore, a state generally would not 
have any interest in regulating Internet communications with such a 
tangential relationship to that state.366 A state only has an incentive to 
regulate Internet communications that either originate or are received 
physically within the geographic boundaries of that state because those 
 
 365. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that the statute at 
issue “contains no express limitation confining it to communications which occur wholly within 
[New Mexico’s] border” and that “there is no guarantee that a message from one New Mexican to 
another New Mexican will not travel through other states en route”); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 
969 F. Supp. 160, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that “a message from an Internet user sitting at a 
computer in New York may travel via one or more other states before reaching a recipient who is 
also sitting at a terminal in New York” and that “a user has no way to ensure that an e-mail [or any 
other Internet communication for that matter] does not pass through New York even if the ultimate 
recipient is not located there”). 
 366. See State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 413 (Wash. 2001) (recognizing that the statute at issue 
“does not impose liability for messages that are merely routed through Washington”). 
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are the situations when the activity can cause harmful effects in that 
state. 
The second aspect of state enforcement of Internet regulations that 
courts have overstated is the limit of a state’s criminal jurisdiction. More 
courts should acknowledge the limits that criminal jurisdiction place on 
the ability of the states to apply their regulations to Internet activity. As 
several courts and commentators have recognized, the reach of a state’s 
regulatory power is limited by the practicalities of a state’s criminal 
jurisdiction. Generally, states do not attempt to enforce their criminal 
statutes on activities that occur wholly outside of the state.367 Normally, 
in order to be subject to prosecution in a particular state, a person must 
have committed at least part of the crime within that state.368 A state 
further would have to extradite a person located in another state normally 
in order to prosecute them.369 However, “extradition from one state to 
another is limited to individuals who have fled the state that seeks 
extradition.”370 Thus, it seems very unlikely that “[a] Web site operator 
who has never had a presence in the regulating state” would face 
prosecution there.371 Nevertheless, states have, in limited circumstances, 
prosecuted defendants who, while located outside of the geographic 
boundaries of the state, engaged in intentional activity that affected 
residents of the forum state.372 Despite these instances, it is very unlikely 
that a state could prosecute the operator of a Web site unless a court 
 
 367. People v. Hayne, No. F036401, 2002 WL 470853, at **9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002) 
(noting that “California law generally bars punishment for wholly extraterritorial offenses”); Hatch 
v. Super Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“The assumption that extraterritorial 
enforcement of state criminal statutes is normative is incorrect.”). 
 368. See People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“California prosecutes 
only those criminal acts that occur wholly or partially within the state.”); Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
472 (stating that under California law a person “may be punished ‘under the laws of this state’ if 
they ‘commit, in whole or in part, any crime within this state’”) (quoting People v. Morante, 975 
P.2d 1071, 1081 (Cal. 1999)). 
 369. Goldman & Sykes, supra note 128, at 815 (“For New York to enforce its criminal law 
against an offender in California, it must extradite him.”). 
 370. Id. See also Goldsmith, supra note 332, at 1220 (recognizing that “the extradition 
obligation only extends to fugitives who have fled [a state], and these terms have long been limited 
to persons who were physically present in the demanding state at the time of the crime’s 
commission”). 
 371. Goldman & Sykes, supra note 128, at 815. See also Goldsmith, supra note 332, at 1217 
(“A defendant’s physical presence or assets within the territory remains the primary basis for a 
nation or state to enforce its laws.”). 
 372. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (“Acts done outside a 
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in 
punishing the cause of the harm as if [the person] had been present at the effect.”); State v. 
Rossbach, 288 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Minn. 1980) (holding that Minnesota court had jurisdiction to 
prosecute a defendant who fired a high powered rifle from inside an Indian reservation at a deputy 
sheriff standing on Minnesota land); State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356, 362 (S.D. 1977) (holding 
that South Dakota court had jurisdiction over defendants who fired several shots from Indian trust 
land at police authorities located in South Dakota). 
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could find that the operator had conducted some act in that state, and 
courts should stop overstating the states’ enforcement capabilities. 
Moreover, when a Web site operator interacts with a state resident 
using a Web browser, the Web site operator arguably conducts an 
activity in the state in which the browser user is located. One 
commentator has noted that: 
Transactions in cyberspace involve real people in one territorial 
jurisdiction either (i) transacting with real people in other territorial 
jurisdictions or (ii) engaging in activity in one jurisdiction that causes 
real-world effects in another territorial jurisdiction. To this extent, 
activity in cyberspace is functionally identical to transnational activity 
mediated by other means, such as mail or telephone or smoke signal.373 
In fact, some courts have held that a person who conducts an activity 
over the telephone at least partially “acts” within the state in which the 
telephone transmission is received.374 Similarly, a Web site operator that 
interacts with a person using a Web browser in a particular state “acts,” 
at least partially, in that state. Therefore, even if a state were able to 
overcome the difficulties of exercising criminal jurisdiction over the 
operator of a Web site whose computer server was located outside of that 
particular state, the state arguably would not be regulating 
extraterritorially if the operator of the Web site had projected itself into 
that state by allowing residents of that state to access the Web site. 
Accordingly, cases such as American Libraries Association have 
exaggerated the potential extraterritorial effect of state Internet 
regulations.375 
 
 373. Goldsmith, supra note 332, at 1239-40. 
 374. See United States v. Pezzino, 535 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that federal 
statute prohibiting the “transmission” of bets or wagers on sporting events over interstate 
communication facilities forbids both the “use of interstate facilities for sending or receiving 
wagering information.”); United States v. Synodinos, 218 F. Supp. 479, 481 (D. Utah 1963) (holding 
a federal district court in Utah to be a proper venue for a case involving a federal statute prohibiting 
the “transmission” of bets or wagers on sporting events over interstate communication facilities 
because “the District of Utah [was] where the use of the interstate wire facilities had its ultimate 
impact, i.e., it was here that the messages . . . were actually received”); State v. Meyers, 825 P.2d 
1062, 1064-65 (Haw. 1992) (upholding a conviction in Hawaii for terrorist-like threats when the 
defendant, while located in California, threatened a judge and his family in a telephone call to her 
probation officer in Hawaii). 
 375. One commentator further has noted that the Supreme Court cases examining the 
extraterritorial effect of state regulation dealt with “laws regulating purely economic activity - 
business takeovers and beer pricing” and that the Am. Libraries Ass’n case “is believed to be the first 
to use the concept to invalidate a state law regulating health and safety.” Biddle, supra note 108, at 
181. For that reason and the reasons noted in the textual analysis above, it can be argued that Judge 
Preska incorrectly held that the statute at issue in Am. Libraries Ass’n was a per se violation of the 
Commerce Clause. Lanin, supra note 3, at 1436. 
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D.  Transportation Cases Utilize the Pike Balancing Test and are Not a 
Monolith Prohibiting State Regulation of Specific Areas 
As explained in section III. D., when the Supreme Court has 
analyzed state regulations dealing with the United States highway and 
railway systems under the Commerce Clause, the Court has not staked 
these areas out as subject only to federal regulation, but instead has 
engaged in the same balancing analysis used in analyzing other types of 
state regulations.376 Moreover, the Court has tended to invalidate a state’s 
regulation of railways and highways when the regulation is widely out of 
step with most other states’ regulation of the subject matter, thus greatly 
raising the cost of compliance with the regulation, or when the state’s 
motivation in enacting the regulation was, at least in part, to discriminate 
against interstate commerce or to advance local in-state interests at the 
expense of out-of-state interests.377 Therefore, asserting that the Internet 
should be staked out as an area solely for regulation by the federal 
government by analogizing the Internet to the highway or railway system 
greatly oversimplifies the analysis of the transportation cases. Instead, 
courts should analyze state Internet regulations on a case by case basis, 
as the Supreme Court analyzed the statutes at issue in the transportation 
cases, and balance the local interests furthered by the regulations against 
the burden that the regulations have on interstate commerce, taking into 
account the considerations set out in sections V. A, and V. B. State 
legislatures should be mindful, though, that regulation of Internet activity 
that is widely out of step with other state regulations of similar activity 
has a good chance of being invalidated. 
VI.  APPLYING THE PROPER CONSIDERATIONS OF BENEFITS AND 
BURDENS TO THE PIKE BALANCING TEST IN ORDER TO RECONCILE 
CASES ANALYZING STATE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET UNDER THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Taking into account the factors presented above concerning the 
putative local benefits of state laws that regulate Internet and Web 
 
 376. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. See also Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 92, 
at 808 (“In sum, inconsistent-regulations cases, like extraterritoriality cases, should be viewed as just 
another variant of balancing analysis.”); James E. Gaylord, Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and 
the Internet: Letting the Dormant Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1116 (1999) 
(noting that Am. Libraries Ass’n’s “third mode of analysis, the potential for inconsistent regulation, 
is not an independent constitutional test” and “represents ‘double-dipping’ in the Commerce Clause 
pot”). 
 377. See supra notes 193-227 and accompanying text. See also Goldsmith & Sykes, supra 
note 92, at 806-07 (“A more plausible interpretation of the inconsistent-regulations concern is that 
non-uniform state regulations might impose compliance costs that are so severe that they counsel 
against permitting the states to regulate a particular subject matter.”). 
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activity and the burden on interstate commerce from such laws can help 
reconcile the case law examining state regulation of the Internet under 
the dormant commerce clause. Explicitly considering these factors also 
will bring this analysis more in line with the federalist governmental 
structure set out in the Constitution.  This section applies these factors to 
the facts of three cases applying the dormant commerce clause to state 
regulations of the Internet: Hatch v. Superior Court, Ford Motor Co. v. 
Texas Department of Transportation, and American Libraries 
Association v. Pataki. 
A.  Hatch v. Superior Court 
In Hatch v. Superior Court, the California statute at issue prohibited 
a person from knowingly subjecting a minor to harmful material over the 
Internet in order to seduce the minor.378 The statute involved a strong 
interest on the part of California, protecting the health and well-being of 
children, and involved the exercise of a traditional police power of the 
state.379 Therefore, a court analyzing the statute should be deferential to 
the California legislature’s judgment regarding the local benefits of the 
statute. 
In analyzing the burden to interstate commerce from the statute, a 
court, first should analyze the interactivity of the Internet behavior being 
regulated. Because the statute required a person to knowingly subject 
minors to harmful material with the purpose of seducing the minor, the 
statute required a person to engage in interactive behavior over the 
Internet in order to be covered by the statute. For people to know that 
they are communicating with a minor, they must receive some 
information from the other person. Receiving information that the other 
person is under the age of majority takes away some of the anonymity of 
the Internet communication. Moreover, being put on notice that the other 
person is a minor, the person involved could discontinue his or her 
communications if he or she did not wish to subject a minor to such 
material. Therefore, the statute regulated interactive Internet 
communications and lessened the burden of complying with the 
California law because interactivity decreases the anonymity of the 
communication. 
In examining the second factor, the type of commerce involved, 
whether more tangible or electronic, the nature of the activity that the 
California legislature attempted to address in the statute, pedophilia, 
 
 378. Hatch v. Supr. Ct., 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). 
 379. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
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ultimately would take a more tangible form.380 A person interested in 
engaging in such activity will desire ultimately to meet in person with the 
minor with whom he or she is communicating. Such a face-to-face 
meeting will take away any remaining anonymity and alert the person to 
the jurisdiction in which he or she is carrying out the prohibited acts. 
Furthermore, in order to meet face-to-face, the person will need to obtain 
information about the geographic location of the person with whom he or 
she is communicating. In fact, not only did the defendant in Hatch 
communicate with a person he believed to be a minor over the Internet, 
but the defendant also met face to face with the supposed minor twice. 
Moreover, pedophiles most likely will want to communicate with minors 
located in close geographic proximity to them, and therefore, much of 
the Internet communication will be initiated and received in the same 
state. Thus, it is very unlikely that a person prosecuted under the statute 
would be unaware of the jurisdiction regulating their activities. Because 
the statute ultimately regulates a more tangible activity, the burden of 
complying with the California statute, again, is decreased due to 
anonymity being lessened. 
The third factor, availability of technology to verify the geographic 
location of Internet users, is inapplicable in Hatch. Because the statute 
regulated interactive Internet communications and dealt with a more 
tangible type of commerce, the use of technology was not necessary to 
decrease the anonymity of the communications. 
When the proceeding factors are considered, the putative benefits of 
the California statute outweighed the minimal burden that the statute 
placed on interstate commerce. The statute involved the exercise of a 
traditional state police power and concerned a strong state interest, 
protecting children. Moreover, because the statute was aimed at 
interactive Internet behavior and ultimately involved activity of a more 
tangible nature, the burden on interstate commerce was slight because 
these two attributes take away much of the anonymity of the 
communications. Therefore, the court in Hatch correctly held that the 
California statute was valid under the dormant commerce clause. 
B.  Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Department of Transportation 
Similarly, applying the factors explained above to Ford Motor Co. v. 
Texas Department of Transportation better explains the result reached. In 
Ford, the Texas motor vehicle code prohibited car manufacturers from 
 
 380. However, admittedly, this type of activity can only meet the very loosest definition of 
commerce. 
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acting in the capacity of a car dealership.381 However, Ford had set up a 
Web site in which residents of the Houston metropolitan area initially 
could view vehicles that had been leased previously and to which Ford 
still owned title, and then these residents could have a specified vehicle 
delivered to a local dealership to view the vehicle in person and test drive 
it.382 The Texas regulations concerned a strong state interest, protecting 
Texas residents from unfair business practices. Even so, since the 
regulations smacked somewhat of economic protectionism—protecting 
local Texas dealerships from competition with out-of-state car 
manufacturers—a court might weigh this interest slightly less heavily 
than the interest involved in Hatch. Because of this, a court might not 
give the Texas legislature’s evaluation of the local benefits of the 
regulations in this situation quite the deference that the California 
legislature received in Hatch. 
Nevertheless, in examining the burden on interstate commerce 
created by applying the Texas Motor Vehicle Code to Ford’s Web site 
activity, one finds that the burden was even less than the burden imposed 
by the California statute in Hatch. First, the Ford Web site was 
interactive, allowing Ford to discover the geographic location of the 
potential buyer through the buyer’s request to have the car delivered to a 
local Houston dealership. Second, Ford’s Web site involved a tangible 
form of commerce, the sale of an automobile, as opposed to electronic 
commerce, allowing Ford the opportunity to verify the geographic 
location of the buyer. Third, the high degree of interactivity of the Web 
site and the tangible nature of the commercial transaction taking place on 
the Web site made the availability of technology to verify the geographic 
location of the user of the Web site inapplicable because Ford already 
was aware of the site user’s geographic location.383 
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit correctly upheld the application of the 
Texas Motor Vehicle Code to the Ford Web site under the Commerce 
Clause. Arguably the benefits from the application of the Texas motor 
vehicle code are not as significant as those in Hatch because the state 
interest that the Texas regulations furthered is weaker. However, the 
interactivity of the Ford site and the tangible commerce that the Web site 
facilitated greatly decreased any anonymity concerning the physical 
location of users of the site. Consequently, the burden of the Texas 
regulation on interstate commerce was minimal. Therefore, the local 
 
 381. Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Transp., 106 F. Supp. 2d 905, at 908 (W.D. Tex. 
2000), aff’d, 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 382. Ford Motor, 264 F.3d at 499; Ford Motor, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 907. 
 383. This factor presumably would become relevant only when the regulation concerned 
affects Web sites that are more passive or involve strictly in electronic commerce. 
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benefits of the regulations outweighed the minimal burden on interstate 
commerce. 
C.  American Libraries Association v. Pataki 
Applying these same factors to American Libraries Association 
would result in invalidation of the statute at issue, although it becomes a 
much closer determination, without staking out the Internet as a federal 
preserve and upsetting the delicate balance of the federalist governmental 
structure set out in the Constitution. In American Libraries Association, 
the New York statute at issue criminalized the intentional use of the 
Internet to communicate to a minor material of a sexual nature that was 
“harmful to minors.”384 The statute provided a defense if the defendant, 
among other things, “made a reasonable effort to ascertain the true age of 
the minor,” “had taken reasonable and effective” actions to prevent 
minors from accessing the site, or restricted access to the site by utilizing 
a credit card identification system or by requiring users to have a PIN.385  
Thus, like Hatch, the New York statute concerned a strong state interest, 
protecting the health and welfare of children, and the exercise of a 
traditional state police power. 
In examining the first factor of the analysis, the interactivity of the 
Web sites and Internet conduct that the statute affected, the statute 
arguably could reach information posted by passive Web sites if the 
“intent” requirement was read liberally. Read liberally, the statute could 
reach a person or entity that simply intended to post or communicate the 
material considered “harmful to minors” and did not necessarily intend 
for such material to reach a minor. Because under such a construction of 
the statute the operator of a Web site would not have to know of the age 
of the recipient, the statute would cover passive Web sites that simply 
provide information and do not interact with users of the sites. In fact, it 
appears that the majority of the plaintiffs in American Libraries 
Association ran passive Web sites.386 Therefore, the statute did burden 
interstate commerce more than the statutes in Hatch and Ford because 
the operator of a passive Web site may have a difficult time in 
determining the age or the physical location of a user of the site and the 
anonymity of the user is more likely to remain. Therefore, the operators 
of these sites would have difficulty determining whether or when they 
needed to comply with the New York law. 
 
 384. See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 385. Id. at 163-64. 
 386. Supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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With regard to the second factor of analysis, the type of commercial 
transactions covered by the New York statute, the statute appeared to 
reach purely electronic transactions. The statute would affect situations 
where “harmful” material, such as sexually explicit pictures, information 
concerning sexual conduct, and so on, was communicated to minors 
simply by being posted on an Internet site. These situations would not 
concern the physical transportation of some type of tangible good 
through the postal system, or some other type of carrier, to the site user. 
Because the statute affected passive Web sites and strictly electronic 
commercial transactions, this implicated the third factor of the analysis, 
the availability of technology to verify the geographic location of site 
users. As set out in section V. B. 3., a court should take into account, 
when determining the burden that a state Internet regulation places on 
interstate commerce, the current availability of certain technology, such 
as credit card verification systems and PINs, that allows the operator of a 
Web site to get rid of the anonymity of site users and determine the 
physical location and other characteristics of users. In fact, the statute 
provided a defense to Web site operators that used such technology. 
However, the use of such technology would be more costly to operators 
of passive Web sites. Because such Web sites generally just provide 
information to site users, the implementation of a credit card verification 
system or the use of PINs would require a much larger investment in the 
site than the operator initially made or even contemplated.387 Some of the 
plaintiffs in American Libraries Association that ran passive Web sites 
were non-profit organizations388 with presumably less financial resources 
than commercial entities to implement such technology. Consequently, 
the costs of complying with the New York statute were relatively high 
for the Web sites potentially affected by the statute.389 
Therefore, although the New York statute at issue in American 
Libraries Association implicated a strong state interest, protecting the 
health and welfare of children, the susceptibility of the statute to a liberal 
interpretation that would affect passive Web sites places a high burden 
on interstate commerce occurring over the Internet. Thus, Judge Preska 
was correct in invalidating the statute at issue in that case. 
While the court was correct in its ruling, as has been demonstrated, 
the court’s reasoning was flawed. In light of the proceeding factors, the 
 
 387. Should the price of this type of technology decrease, though, it might be more reasonable 
to expect even a passive Web site to use it. 
 388. From the description of the plaintiffs provided in the case, it appears that Art on the Net 
and the ACLU were nonprofit organizations that ran passive Web sites. Am Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. 
Supp. at 162. 
 389. Presumably, if the cost of this technology decreased, the burden on interstate commerce 
from such a statute would decrease, and the regulation might be constitutional. 
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court’s use of the extraterritorial analysis and the broad assertion that the 
Internet requires only regulation by the federal government is 
unwarranted. The court could have held that the statute was 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in a manner that showed 
more deference to the states legitimately exercising their police powers 
in a manner more consistent with the federalism principles of the 
Constitution. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Although the manner in which the Internet and the Web operate 
raises some issues with regard to state Internet regulation due to the 
transient and anonymous nature of Internet communications, state 
Internet regulations that affect more interactive Internet communications 
and Internet commerce dealing with more tangible types of goods can 
still pass muster under the Commerce Clause when the state regulations 
further strong state interests. In analyzing such statutes, courts do not 
have to engage in sweeping generalizations about the appropriateness of 
all state regulation of Internet activity. Instead, to more appropriately 
balance the states’ interests in protecting the safety and welfare of their 
residents against the need for uninhibited commerce to occur between 
states, courts should examine state Internet regulations on a case-by-case 
basis taking into account the considerations explained above. 
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Appendix 
ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF THE INTERNET 
The manner in which the Internet came into being helps explain why 
it operates in the way that it does, and understanding the operations of 
the Internet allows one to appreciate fully the issues that the Internet 
creates for state regulation under the dormant commerce clause. This 
appendix provides a brief explanation of how the Internet was developed.  
Although most articles dealing with state regulation of the Internet do not 
discuss this topic in much detail, some readers may find that this brief 
history of the Internet provides helpful context for the issues discussed in 
this article. 
The first computer network was developed through funding from a 
scientific research branch of the United States Department of Defense 
called the Advanced Research Projects Agency (“ARPA”).390 ARPA, 
created by the Eisenhower administration in 1958, was a special 
scientific research section of the Defense Department whose stated 
purpose was “the bolstering of national defense.”391 Nevertheless, some 
of ARPA’s research did not deal strictly with military capabilities.392 For 
example, ARPA supported “leading edge” computer research,393 which 
led to the development of the ARPANET. The ARPANET resulted from 
a need for time-sharing of computers.394 Consequently, the ARPANET 
 
 390. See Walt Howe, A Brief History of the Internet, in THE INTERNET 3 (Gray Young ed., 
1998). See generally KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE 
ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET (1996) (providing an in-depth description of the development of the first 
interconnected computer network called the ARPANET). In 1971, ARPA’s name was changed to 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”), and then in 1993, the agency’s name was 
changed back to ARPA. Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet n.4 (2000), at 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (Aug. 4, 2000). However, in 1996, the agency’s 
name was changed back to DARPA once again. Id. The author will refer to this agency as ARPA 
throughout this article. 
 391. See MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 34. 
 392. See id. (stating that because Eisenhower was a “passionate believer in scientific 
exploration” ARPA received some “government funds to carry out open-ended research”). 
 393. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 12-13 (stating that ARPA’s Information 
Processing Techniques Office, the section of ARPA “charged with supporting the nation’s most 
advanced computer research-and-development projects,” had a “strong connection to the leading 
edge of the computer research community”). 
In all, there were some twenty principal investigators, supporting dozens of graduate 
students, working on numerous projects, all of them funded by [ARPA’s Information 
Processing Techniques Office]. Most of [this section’s] $19 million budget was being 
sent to campus laboratories in Boston and Cambridge, or out to California, to support 
work that held the promise of making revolutionary advances in computing. 
 394. Id. at 10 (stating that the purpose of the ARPANET was “to link computers at scientific 
laboratories across the country so that researchers might share computer resources”); MOSCHOVITIS 
ET AL., supra note 44, at 34-35 (stating that an ARPA manager, Bob Taylor, directed the agency to 
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initially connected researchers at various universities and research 
institutes and allowed them to access computers in other locations.395 By 
1979, more than a hundred different sites were connected by the 
ARPANET.396 
In order to increase the usefulness of the ARPANET, ARPA 
supported the development of computer messages, called protocols, that 
not only allowed several computers to communicate, but that allowed 
different networks to communicate with one another.397 This protocol 
 
create the ARPANET due to “a very real need to share scarce computer resources”). See also Shea v. 
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that the ARPANET developed out of an 
“experimental project” of ARPA “designed to provide researchers with direct access to 
supercomputers at a few key laboratories”). In the late 1960s, the large mainframe computers used 
for scientific research were very expensive, “ranging from $500,000 to more than $1 million each.” 
Morse, supra note 27 at 1118. Due to the high cost of computers at the time, it made sense 
financially to attempt to network several of the then existing computers to allow for greater use of 
these computers rather than purchasing new computers. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 43-
44 (“Researchers were duplicating, and isolating, costly computing resources. Not only were the 
scientists at each site engaging in more, and more diverse, computer research, but their demands for 
computer resources were growing faster than [ARPA’s] budget.”); Morse, supra note 27, at 1118 
(“The demand for costly computer resources, coupled with duplication of effort caused by 
independent operating systems, required some means to permit a sharing of resources and 
research.”). 
 A common misconception exists that the Defense Department created the ARPANET in order to 
develop a communications network that could withstand a nuclear attack. HAFNER & LYON, supra 
note 27, at 10 (“Rumors had persisted for years that the ARPAnet had been built to protect national 
security in the face of a nuclear attack. It was a myth that had gone unchallenged long enough to 
become widely accepted as fact.”); MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 35 (“It is worth noting 
that ARPAnet was not, as is often repeated, created as part of some Cold War doomsday scenario.”); 
Leiner, supra note 390, n.5 (discussing “the false rumor started claiming that the ARPAnet was 
somehow related to building a network resistant to nuclear war”). This misunderstanding probably 
arose from papers drafted in the 1960s by Paul Baran, an employee of the RAND Corporation, that 
conceived of developing such a computer network for this purpose. Id. at 25, n.5 (“It was from 
[Baran’s] RAND study that the false rumor started claiming that the ARPAnet was somehow related 
to building a network resistant to nuclear war.”). See also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 54-56 
(discussing in-depth Baran’s idea for a computer network, separate from ARPA’s project, for the 
purpose of having communications facilities that could survive a nuclear attack); MOSCHOVITIS ET 
AL., supra note 44, at 35 (“Although Baran’s work was extremely influential on the ARPAnet 
founders, his imagined network never came to fruition.”). 
 The RAND Corporation was a prominent civilian defense think tank. “It was the original think 
tank, a strange hybrid of which the unique mission was to apply rational analysis and the latest 
quantitative methods to the problem of how to use the terrifying new nuclear weaponry to forestall 
war with Russia—or to win a war if deterrence failed.” SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (1998). 
 395. The architects of the ARPANET in 1969 connected computers at four different research 
sites, Stanford Research Institute: University of California Los Angeles, University of California at 
Santa Barbara and the University of Utah. Morse, supra note 27, at 1119; Howe, supra note 390, at 
3. See also HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 155 (describing the initial networking of these first 
four sites). By the end of 1971, twenty more sites were connected to the network, MOSCHOVITIS ET 
AL., supra note 44, at 35, and by August 1972, twenty-nine different sites were connected. Morse, 
supra note 27, at 1119. 
 396. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 102. 
 397. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Having successfully 
implemented a system for the reliable transfer of information over a computer network, ARPA 
began to support the development of communications protocols for transferring data between 
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was dubbed transmission control protocol (“TCP”).398 After TCP was 
tested in 1977,399 the ARPANET finally converted to the protocol in 
1983,400 and several other networks began connecting with 
ARPANET.401 At that point, a set of interconnected networks—a true 
“Internet” –existed. Therefore, while the Internet today may appear to be 
a “single, uniform network,” numerous independent networks really 
comprise the Internet.402 
Over time, the Defense Department tired of the administrative 
expense of operating the network403 and in 1989 dismantled the 
ARPANET.404 By that time, though, the technology of the ARPANET 
had given rise to several other computer networks. One of the most 
significant of these was NSFNET. 
 
different types of computer networks.”); HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 223-27 (describing the 
development of transmission control protocol, known as “TCP,” which allowed information to be 
exchanged between different networks); MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 80-82 (describing 
the development of transmission control protocol (“TCP”)). Transmission control protocol “is the 
only element of the international network that must be uniform among the small networks, and it is 
the crucial element that makes global networking possible.” MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 
82. 
 398. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 226 (stating that the protocol that allowed 
information to be transferred between networks was “called transmission-control protocol, or TCP, 
messages”); MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 65 (“A way had to be found for the three 
systems to communicate, and that way was the transmission control protocol (TCP).”). Later, 
programmers broke off the portion of TCP that dealt specifically with routing information between 
networks into a separate protocol called “Internet protocol” (“IP”). HAFNER & LYON, supra at 238. 
See also MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra at 91 (“In 1978 an idea put forth by engineers from Xerox 
Corporation cause[d] a TCP enhancement: Internet Protocol (IP), a separate program that handles the 
routing of individual messages. The TCP portion [was] now responsible only for the construction 
and unloading of datagrams.”). Thus, TCP became TCP/IP. HAFNER & LYON, supra at 238. See also 
MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra at 91 (“Together, the protocols become known as TCP/IP and represent 
the standard system used in most large networks.”). See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text 
for a further explanation of the differences between IP and TCP. 
 399. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 90-91 (describing the testing of transmission 
control protocol in 1977). 
 400. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 248-49 (describing the transition of the ARPANET to 
TCP/IP in 1983); Leiner, supra note 390 at 10 (“One of the more interesting challenges was the 
transition of the ARPAnet host protocol from NCP [Network Control Protocol] to TCP/IP as of 
January 1, 1983.”). 
 401. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926 (stating that after TCP was developed “[u]niversities, 
research facilities, and commercial entities began to develop and link together their own networks 
implementing these protocols”). 
 402. THE INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 29. 
 403. See HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 255 (stating that the ARPANET “cost ARPA $14 
million a year to run” and describing the decision by the Defense Department to take the ARPANET 
offline). 
 404. See id. at 255-56 (describing the manner in which the Defense Department took the 
ARPANET offline); Leiner, supra note 390, at n.10 (stating that the University of California at Los 
Angeles commemorated the decommissioning of the ARPANET in 1989 with a symposium 
celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the network’s existence). 
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NSFNET was “a high-speed ‘backbone’ network,”405 which the 
National Science Foundation (“NSF”) sponsored.406 The NSF “was 
created in 1950 to promote progress in science by funding basic research 
and strengthening education in science,” and by the late 1970s, the NSF 
was an important player in the computer programming field.407 NSFNET 
arose out of a desire of those scientists and researchers that did not do 
defense-related work to access other networks and better communicate 
with one another.408 Because only people doing research for the Defense 
Department were able to access the ARPANET,409 NSFNET allowed a 
new segment of the population, academics and researchers not involved 
in defense research, to access the Internet. NSFNET then spawned 
several regional networks that connected to one another through 
NSFNET.410 This caused the number of sites connected to the Internet, 
mainly at universities, to increase dramatically, and by 1989, more than 
100,000 sites were connected to the Internet.411 
The NSF then encouraged regional networks to allow commercial 
use while at the same time enforcing an “Acceptable Use Policy” on 
NSFNET “which prohibited Backbone usage for purposes ‘not in support 
 
 405. Networks comprised of very large communication links “that can carry relatively large 
amounts of traffic, typically via optical fiber cables” commonly are referred to as the Internet 
“backbone.” THE INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 31. See also Burk, supra note 3, at 9 
(“The major conduit or superhighway for a computer network is referred to as a ‘backbone’ network, 
which is a high capacity network linking other networks together.”). 
There is no easy way to specify which networks [currently] comprise the Internet 
backbone. For instance, in some countries a rather modest link may serve as the local 
backbone. Nor do all connections between providers take place through the backbone—
there is no assurance that any particular data packet will flow through any part of the 
Internet’s backbone. 
THE INTERNET’S COMING OF AGE, supra note 3, at 31 n.3. 
 406. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 926. See also MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 145 (“In 1986 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) had implemented NSFnet, a faster network, to allow more 
connections to the ARPAnet (or Internet as it was by then popularly known).”; HAFNER & LYON, 
supra note 27, at 245 (describing how NSF came to agree “to build the backbone network, to be 
called NSFNET”). 
 407. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 240. 
 408. See id. at 241 (“[T]he ARPAnet was threatening to split the community of computer 
researchers into haves and have-nots. In 1979 there were about 120 academic computer science 
departments around the country, but just fifteen of the sixty-one ARPAnet sites were located at 
universities.”); MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 125 (“NSFnet allowed researchers who were 
not working on defense-related projects to get connected [to the Internet].”). 
 409. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 27, at 242 (“To be assigned a site [on the ARPANET], 
universities had to be involved in specific kinds of government-funded research, typically defense-
related.”). 
   410. [T]he NSF offered that if the academic institutions in a geographic region put together a 
community network, the agency would give the community network access to the backbone 
network. . . . In response, a dozen or so regional networks were formed around the country. 
Each had the exclusive franchise in that region to connect to the NSFNET backbone. 
Id. at 245. 
 411. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 134. 
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of Research and Education.’”412 “The predictable (and intended) result of 
encouraging commercial network traffic at the local and regional level, 
while denying its access to national-scale transport, was to stimulate the 
emergence” and growth of several private “long-haul networks.”413 The 
NSF finally ceased funding NSFNET in 1995, completing the 
transformation of the Internet “backbone” from a federally funded 
network primarily serving the research community to a privatized 
network run completely by commercial entities.414 By this time, “the 
Internet [had grown] to over 500,000 networks on all seven continents 
and outer space, with approximately 29,000 networks in the United 
States.”415 
One particular invention—the World Wide Web—helped increase 
the amount of traffic on NSFNET and the eventual privatized backbone 
networks. Up until the early 1990s, only the computer literate could use 
the Internet.416 The World Wide Web helped change this. Tim Berners-
Lee, a British network programmer at CERN, a physics institute in 
Geneva, Switzerland, created the “World Wide Web” (the “Web”) in 
order to access in a more efficient manner information stored in the 
institute’s various computers.417 The Web used “a hypertext system to 
provide ‘a single user-interface to many large classes of stored 
 
 412. Leiner, supra note 390 at 12. 
 413. Id. See also J. Neil Weintraut, Introduction, in Architects of the Web: 1,000 Days that 
Built the Future of Business xiii, xxi-xxii (Robert H. Reid, 1997) (describing how NSFNET 
technology “permeat[ed]” into corporations through engineers bringing “their university accounts 
and electronic mail (E-mail) addresses with them to their jobs subsequent to graduation” and how 
the Acceptable Use Policy “set the stage for a number of Internet engineers to start businesses to 
provide ‘turnkey’ Internet access services to a local region”). 
 414. Leiner, supra note 390, at 12. See also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (describing how NSFNET eventually gave rise to “large commercial networks run by 
organizations such as Sprint, IBM, and Performance Systems International”); Weintraut, supra note 
413, at xxii (stating that “what today we loosely call the Internet is predominately a collection of 
nationwide and international networks independently operated by UUNET, PSInet, NETCOM, 
BBN, and MCI”). 
 415. Leiner, supra note 390, at 13. 
 416. See CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 5 (stating that “the Internet of the late 80s 
and early 90s was hard to use,” and that while “[s]ending an email message or posting a thought to a 
newsgroup was fairly simple for the computer literate . . . doing anything else required a hefty 
knowledge of commands and options”). 
 417. See MOSCHOVITIS, supra note 44, at 149 (describing how Berners-Lee had created the 
Web because he had “frustrated with the absence of a network to link the massive stores of data at 
the institution” and because he was “[t]ired of struggling with the numerous platforms used to hold 
and manipulate information on isolated machines”); ROBERT H. REID, ARCHITECTS OF THE WEB: 
1,000 DAYS THAT BUILT THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS 3 (1997) (stating that Berners-Lee “reckoned 
that he could come up with a better way of organizing documents and other professional information 
than the usual haphazard methods”); JOE HABRAKEN, supra note 56, at 236 (“Scientists at the CERN 
research laboratory developed the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) so that they could exchange 
information about their projects over their TCP/IP network.”). 
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information.’”418 In developing the Web, Berners-Lee used special 
software that allowed users to display “a page on a computer screen 
exactly as it appears on the printed version.”419 The most important part 
of his work on the Web was Hypertext Markup Language (“HTML”), 
which gave programmers a way to tell computers “how to display a 
document.”420 Berners-Lee’s work also gave rise to the concept of 
“links,” which allowed people to connect to other documents through a 
word on, and several commands embedded in, the computer screen.421 
“Berners-Lee used hypertext technology to link together a web of 
documents that could be traversed in any manner to seek out 
information.”422 
After Berners-Lee completed his work, others made the Web easier 
to use by creating Web browsers423 that allowed people to better access 
the Web with personal computers. In the early 1990s, the National 
Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois 
created the web browser Mosaic that added graphics to Web documents 
and that used software compatible with computers that ran several 
different types of operating systems, including Unix, Windows, and 
Macintosh.424 Marc Andreessen, who “as an undergraduate” was “one of 
the original programmers” of Mosaic, then founded the Netscape 
company to sell the Mosaic web browser under the name “Netscape 
 
 418. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 149-50. The “interface” that Berners-Lee 
developed consisted of “a rasterized display of iconographic or pictoral [sic] symbols and objects 
typically manipulated on-screen by a pointer controlled by a pointing device such as a mouse or 
trackball.” Lanin, supra note 3, at 1426 n.18 (citing conversation with Nathan Raymond (Feb. 21, 
1999)). 
 419. MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 150. 
 420. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 6. 
 421. See id. at 6 (“But what really caught people’s imagination was the idea of a link. Now, 
documents could embed relationships; you could jump from one document to another, make lists of 
your favorite web sites, and even build some simple games.”); Howe, supra note 390, at 6 (stating 
that Berners-Lee’s new protocol “was based on hypertext—a system of embedding links in text to 
link to other text”). Berners-Lee also created Hypertext Transfer Protocol, known as “HTTP,” and 
the Universal Resource Locator, known as “URL.” MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 150. 
HTTP “serves as the protocol for accessing data and traversing hypertext links.” MOSCHOVITIS ET 
AL., supra note 44, at 164. An URL is “an address scheme for pointing the system to a particular 
location within ‘the Web’ information space.” MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 164. See infra 
notes 103-110 and accompanying text for further explanation of how the Web works. 
 422. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 107. 
 423. “[B]rowsers are [software] programs that allow users to seek, retrieve, and read hypertext 
documents.” MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 172. See also Lanin, supra note 3, at 1426 n.20 
(describing “Web browsing” as “the process by which a computer user connected to the Internet may 
view hypertext information presented in ‘pages’ of content, and call up other ‘pages’ through links 
embedded in the hypertext”). 
 424. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 6; Weintraut, supra note 413, at xxiv-xxv. See 
also MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, at 171-73 (describing the creation of the Mosaic web 
browser). 
LOUDENSLAGER - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:05 PM 
191] STATE INTERNET REGULATION 263 
Navigator.”425 The combination of the Web and browsers that made the 
Web more user-friendly caused “the explosive growth that has made the 
Internet what it is today.”426 
 
 
 425. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 6. See also MOSCHOVITIS ET AL., supra note 44, 
at 176-77 (describing the founding of Netscape Communications Corporation). 
 426. CONNER-SAX & KROL, supra note 27, at 6. See also Howe, supra note 390, at 6 (“The 
development in 1993 of the graphical browser Mosaic by Marc Andreessen and his team at the 
National Center For Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) gave the [Web] protocol its big boost.”). 
